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INTRODUCTION 
'REW issues have sparked as much debate and disagreement 
..!.. among Law and Economics scholars as the prohibition on in­
sider trading.1 Ironically, the Supreme Court's attempts in Chiarella 
v. United States/ Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Comtn.issiun/ 
and, most recently, in United States v. 0' Hagw/ to clarify the scope 
and content of the ban on insider trading, and the subsequent reac­
tion of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"),; have 
'See. e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, The Insider Trad ing Prohibition:  A Legal and 
Economic Enigma, 38 U. Fl a. L. Rev. 35,36 n.7 (1986) (noti n g  that the appl ication of 
the pri nciples of Law and Economics to the problem of i ns ider trading is highly 
controversial "both within the Law and Economics school and outs ide it''). For useful 
summaries of the debate, see generally Charles C. Cox & Kevi n  S. Fogarty. Bases of 
Insider Trading Law, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 353 (L988): Boyd Kimball Dyer. Economic 
Analysis, Insider Trading, and Game Markets. 1992 Utah L. Rev. 1. 
'445 U.S. 222,235 (1980) (holdin g that the ·'duty to d isclose under� iO(b) does not 
arise from the mere possession of n o npub lic market i n formation''). 
'463 U.S. 646,654 (1983) (holding that the duty to disclose nonpublic information 
arises nut from the �lctual possession of the in formation but from :1 fiduciarv 
relationship with the corporation or the sel l er of secur ities). 
· 
'521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997) (holding that "a perso n who t rades in se cur iti es fo1· 
rc:rsonal profit. using confidential i n formation misaprrupriated in bre ach ot' a 
fiduciary dutv to the source of the i n formation ,'· is guilty of viol ating·� lO(h) a n d  Rule 
IOb-5). 
'The SEC reacted to these holdings i n  several ways. Following Cliiureila, in an 
attempt to narrow the scope of the holding, the SEC enacted Rule 14c-3(a), whose 
validity in some contexts remains doubtful. Sec O'Hagan, 52L U.S. at 672 n.\7 (1997). 
Then, in respo nse to Dirks the SEC had initially supported tbe cou rt ' s ru l ing , 
exempting select i ve disclosure to investment analysts. Later on, the SEC retreated 
from i t s  ear lier position and attempted to expand Dirks' "person al  bc:n cfit" test. Sec 
SEC v. Stevens, Litigation Release No. 12813, 1991 SEC LEXlS 451 (Mar. 19, Jl)9I) 
( attem pti ng to hold Stevens l iable for i n forming market analysts about earnings in 
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onlv added fuel to t he fire of the  academic debate already ragmg ,..' . 6 
on the 1ssue. 
The most  intriguing  feature of the debate on ins ider trading is 
that all contributors seek to promote the same goal: e n hancing  the 
efficiency' and l iquidity" of securit ies  markets.9 Substantial d is­
agrcernent exists. however, as to how the ban on insider trading 
affects the twin goals of efficiency and liquidi ty. Critics of the ban 
on insider trading main tain that permitting ins iders to take advan­
tage of ins ide informati on is the  best way to ensure efficien t  share 
prices."' Given that ins i ders have ready access to i n side informa­
tion, crit ics argue that permitt ing them to derive private benefit 
from such information guarantees that new information \vill reach 
the  marke t  rapidly, and consequently, that share prices will adjust 
quickly to reflect the new information.11 By contrast, proponen ts of 
the ban con tend t hat repealing it will d im i nish market efficiency.'2 
Since ins iders seek to  maximize their own gain, not market effi­
ciency, proponents con t end that absen t  a prohib i t ion on insider 
trading, ins iders would wi thh old valuable information from the  
market until i t  i s  opt imal for them to trade ,  t hereby compromising 
the efficie ncy of the capi tal market .13 
order to increase his reputation, although the action ultimately settled). Finding this 
latter step ineffective, the SEC enacted the Fair Disclosure Regulations, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 243 (2001 ), on August 24, 2000, partially reversing Dirks' holding. For a description 
of the SEC's historical initiatives, see Donald C. Langevoort. Investment Analysts 
and the Law of Insider Trading, 7(-, Va. L. Rev. 1023, J 034-36 (1990). 
''Jonathan R. Macey. Insider Trading: Economics, Politics, and Policy 7 (1991) ("A 
great deal of debate has concerned how much harm insider trading docs to 
investors."). !vlaccy, perhaps the leading authority on the matter. writes: "Those ... 
who takt: a ·tough minded' scientific or economic approach to the debate [about 
insider trading] inevitably end by condoning the practice on efficiency grounds that 
seem to others implausible. if not incredible.·· !d. at 2 (emphases added). 
't\ securities market is efficient when share prices reflect all available information 
about the traclecl companies and their businesses. Eugene F. Fama. Efficient Capital 
Markets: c\ Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. Fin. 383, 383 ( l Y70). 
'A securities market is liquid when investors can buy or sell shares on vcrv short 
notice. Macey. supra note 6, at 7. 
· See id. at ll ("All sides of the debate about insider trading have argued that the 
rules they pre fe r  will enhance market efficiency and liquidity."). 
;n See id. 
"See iJ. 
12 See id. 
''See. e.g .. David Ferber. The Case Against T nsider Trading: A Response to 
Professur Manne, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 621, 6:23 (1970) ("But if insiders were permitted to 
profit from inside information, there would be a natural tendency for insiders to 
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Shifting the focus of the debate to a contractual sphere, Carlton 
and Fischel framed the matter as an issue of efficient allocation of 
property rights in inside information_'" Oddly, however, they as 
well as other Law and Economics scholars have limited the list  of 
potenti al e ntitlement holders to two: tl�e managers a n d  the share­
h olders_15 In other words, the scope of the inquiry has been 
restricted to the boundaries of the firm. ;\s Jonathan iVIaccy writes: 
"[T)he debate about insider trading is redlly a debate about how to 
allocate a property right within a firm.,.,{, \Vhen insid e r  trading is 
permit ted, m anage rs '>vill reduce their salary deman d s  by a n  
amount equal t o  the expected gain from insider trading, there fore 
benefiting the shareholders wh o will pay !ower salaries to the man­
agers. 17 The choice between paying higher salaries a n d  permitting 
i n sider trading ultimately depends on the particular characteristics 
of each i n dividual firm and on its m anagers' attitudes t oward risk.1� 
Because different firms will choose to allocate property rights in in­
side information diftercntly, a pmverfui argument in insid er trading 
literature suggests that  s h areholders and manage rs should b e  per­
mitted to contract over the allocation of property rights in i nsid e  
i nformation.19 Moreover, several schol ars h ave pointed out tha t  t h e  
prohibition o n  i nsider trading does n o t  benefit the shareholders be­
cause the ban does not transfer the value of the i nformation to the 
prolong the period prior t o  disclosun�··): Joel Seligman. The Reformulation of 
Federal Securities Law Co;;cerning Nonpuhlic Information. 73 Geo. LJ. 1083, !119, 
1121 (1985). 
'"Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. FischeL The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 
Stan. L Rev. 857,866-72 (1983). � � 
"See id. at 861, 863 (analyzing shareholders· and managers· entitlements but stating 
that "[w]hethcr insider trading is bendicial depend:; on whether the property right in 
information is more valuable to the firm's managers or to the firm's inve�tors" and 
structuring its analysis around this point but acknowledging that "the arguments for 
and aga inst insider trading mav c;pply equally to trading bv others''): see, e.g., David 
D. Haddock & Jonathan R. 1-l!accy, A Coasian Model of !nsidCi Trading, 80 Nw. U_ 
L. Rev. 1449,1449-50 (1986). 
"Macey, supra note 6. at 4 (emph?.sis added). 
17 See Macey, supra note 6. at 5-12: Haddock & Macey, supra note 15, at l463. 
"See Macey. supra note 6, at 4--12. 
,. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 14, at 861--66 (applying the Coasc theorem to 
insider trading analysis) : Haddock & Iv!accy, supra rwte l5, at 1451, 1468 (calling for a 
contractual resolution of the insider trading dilemma). 
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shareholders, but rather to professional investors.2° Consequently, 
the blanket prohibition on insider tradi ng occasions a loss to the 
shareholders as a group without offering them any redeeming 
benefits. The shareholders lose twice: T hey pay higher salaries to 
managers, and they do not get the value of the inside information. 
The seeming superiority of a contractual solution to the problem of 
insider trading has led several leac!in� C1.1mmentat ors to conclude 
that the existing ban on insider trauing diminishes the welfare of 
shareholders.:' Moreover, some of these commentators have even 
suggest ed that the ban on i nsider trading is the result of the dispro­
portionate political power of market a na l ysts who manipulated the 
political process to e ffect a wealth transfer from the managers to 
themselves. 22 
We challenge both these conclusions and the analysis on which 
they rest. In particular, we posit that existing analysis is misguided 
as it rests on the erroneous assumption that property rights to in­
side information must be allocated within the boundaries of the 
firm-namely, either to shareholders or to managers. Conse­
quently, existing analysis ignores the possibility of awarding the 
property right of inside information to market analysts. This omis­
sion stems, in our view, from the analytical convention that 
property right entitlements must be positively assigned to a particu­
lar well-defined actor or group-in this context, managers or 
shareholders. We observe that property rights may also be "as­
signed" negatively to deny a certain group (managers) the use of a 
particular resource (inside information) in order to afford free ac­
cess to the resource to anyone who wishes to utilize it (market 
analysts). We utilize this observation to develop an innovative 
market approach to the problem of insider trading. 
The adoption of a market-wide approach to the problem of in­
sider trading enables us to present three novel insights. 
,., See. e.g., David D. H:1cldock & Junathan R. :vlacey, Regulation on Demand: A 
Private Interest ModeL with an Applic<�tion to I nsidcr Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & 
Econ. 311. 338 ( 1987). 
"See Macey , supra note 6. at 3-5: Haddock & Macey. supra note 15, at 1468. 
"Sec Michael P. Dooley. Fundamentals of Corporation Law 816-57 (1995) 
(explaining why the SEC targeted markt:t analysts as part of its enforcement 
program) : Macey. supra note 6, ai 17-2.0 (describing to whom the insider trading 
reg ulation was sole!); Haddock & Macc:y. supra note 20. at 328-29 (same). 
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First, we show that when market analysts are taken into consid­
eration, it becomes apparent that the choice between insiders and 
market analysts raises a broader policy inquiry: 'vVhich of the two 
groups�insiders or analysts�wi!l better enhance efficiency in in­
formation and capital markets'):' 
'vVe demonstrate that analysts outperform insiders in providing 
efficiencv to both markets.�' in ,;,�cmities rn<lrkt:ts. analvst5 orice ..1 . - - ' ,.1 1 
stocks more efficientlY than insiders because analvsts consider both 
firm -specific information and general rnarket inf�rmation.:' In con­
trast insiders oniv consider th,.: forrner type of information. 
und�rmining their ;bility to price efficiently."'- In addition, analysts 
provide superior liquidity to financi 21 rnarkets.27 Liquidity cruciail y 
depends on the number of transactions in the market. Both insiders 
and market analysts trade when the market val ue of a given share 
deviates from their private valuation. However, because the sub­
jective valuations of analysts widely diverge, the number of trades 
in a competitive analysts' market far exceeds the number of trades 
in a concentrated insider market. Moreover, because market ana­
lysts are better diversified and capitalized than insiders, the volume 
of trades generated by a competitive analysts' market is far greater 
than the volume of trades generated in a highly imperfect insider 
market.2'� 
Second, we show that allocating the property right to market 
analysts is the only way to ensure the integrity of securities mar­
kets. Gathering and processing information about share prices are 
services that may be performed either by insiders or by market 
analysts. Because of their superior access to inside information, in­
siders would consistently beat market analysts when trading 
against them in the market and would event u a l l y drive the analysts 
'' See infra Section I. B. 
''See infra Section ll.B 
'' See i nfra Section Il.B.l. 
"'Sec infra Section T.B.l. 
27 See Laura Beny, i\ Cornparativ�� Elnpirical Investigation of .Ag�.:�ncy' and fv1arket 
Theories of Insider Tra_ding 6. h t t p://papt' t·s.s�;rn .con1/sol3/papcrs.cfn1 ?abslract_ici 
=193070 (Sept. 1999) (unpublished mzww;cript) (comparing the impact of insider 
trading regulation in t hirty-three countric:�; and finding thztt "v;c:aker ins ider tra ding 
regimes have, on average. less liquid equity mz�rkcts"). 
"For our discussion on liquidi ty and the superiority ut· analvsts in providing 
l iquidity. sec infra Section II.B.2. 
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out of the market.2" This dominance would come at a dear price. 
The existence of market analysts generates valuable positive exter­
nalities that woul d be lost if insiders were to control securities 
markets. A com pe titiv e analysts' marke t p roduces efficient infor­
mation markets.�" Competition among anal ysts is responsible for 
the plethora of i nformation sources. such as financial newspapers, 
financial klcvision channels, and financial web sites. These infor­
matiun suurces improve investors· understanding of financial 
mJrkc:ts anJ enhance their confidence in them, which in turn in­
creases both the number of investors and their willingness to 
invest. Moreover, these information sources improve o ve ra l l pric­
ing by other professional investors. Additionally, a vibrant 
analysts' market supports the investment banking market and 
draws foreign corporations from a less d eve lo ped analysts' market 
to issue shares and list them in countries with a better developed 
analysts' market.'1 
Given the numerous po sit ive external ities generated by a vibrant 
analysts' market-all of which t1ow directly from the prohibition 
on insider trading and would not exist otherwise-the issue of in­
sider trading cannot be left to contractual arrangement on a firm 
by firm basis. In deciding whether to permit insider trading, firms 
only consider their gains and losses, and exclude from the calculus 
the broad er societal interest in having developed financial markets. 
In a contractual regime, firms who stand to gain from permitting 
insider trading will permi t the practice vvithout taki ng into account 
the social cost of their decisions. Our analysis indicates that the so­
ci;;\l cost of permitting insider trading may far outweigh the private 
gain to the individual firms that would otherwise permit it. The de­
cision as to whether to permit insider trading should not be th e 
subject of private contracting; the imposition of a blanket prohibi­
tion is the most efficient way to address the issue. 
Final ly, our anal ytical framework illuminJtes two specific prob­
lems w ith which the SEC and the Supreme Court h ave long 
grappled. The first is the problem of ·'selective disclosure," which 
involves discl osure of inside information by mangers to a small 
'''See infra Part I:� ll.C. 
'"See infra Section lll.A. 
·'1 Sec infrJ Section I!T.B. 
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grou p  of analysts ahead o f  the m arket.32 The secon d  is the proble m 
of " wareho using. "  which arises when a potenti a l bidder t i ps a small 
grou p  of related investors about her intention to bid for a spec i f i c  
t a rge t corporation based on t h e un derstandi ng that the i n ve s t o rs 
wil l tender the i r h o ld i ng to h e r  once the bid is made publ i c . ' '  
E ffectivE as  o f  O c tober 23 .  2000, the SEC's  n e w l y enac t e d  Fair 
D i sclo s ure Re2. u i a t i o n s  p ro h i b i t  any form of se lec tive d i sclus u r c .  
m a ndating i n stead eq ual t i mi n g  o f  disclosu re. '" S ince this  rule  i n­
creases  compe t i t i o n  amo ng a n < t l ys ts ,  i t  w i l l cl early h a ve a des i rable 
effect on companies e nj oy i n g  higl: l i q uid i ty i n  trading a n J  \v i J e  
analysts ' coverage.  However, we show !hat the SEC has fa i led to 
consi der the beneficial market effects of selec t i ve d i sc l osu re o n  
s m a l l  a nd r e l a t ive ly  i l l iq u i d  comp an i es.35 For compan i es t h a t  fa i l  to 
attract sufficient i n vest o r  <1ttentio n ,  select ive disclosure is an i m ­
portant mechanism for i n i tiating analysts ' coverage. Th us, w e  
q uesti on the over- inclusiveness o f  the new rule. ·wh i l e  w e  com­
mend the application of the n ew ru le  to companies t h a t  a l ready 
have wide a n a lyst s '  coverage , we believe that s m a l l  comp a nies 
whose shares suffer from illiq uid tr ading should be exem pt . '(· 
As for warehousing, although the practice is prohibited under 
SEC R u le 1 4e-3 ( a) , '7 the val idity of this rule in this context rem a i n s  
u n c l e ar . '' We show that l egal regu lation o f  warehousing requ i res 
careful b a l ancing between the market for corporate control and the 
capital market .  W h i l e  ware housing fac i l i t a tes s uccessfu l t a ke overs,  
i t  m a y  reduce the return to a nalysts on investment i n  in formation."' 
The ar ti c l e  cons ists o f  fou r  parts. In Part I, we w i l l presen t  o u r  
m arket model  i n  w h ich fou r  gr o u ps of  i nvestors-insiders, i nforma­
t i on traders ,  l iquidity t raders ,  and noise trade rs-i n te r a c t .  U s i n g  
'' See i nfr<l Sect i u n J V . A .  
' ' Sec i n fra Sect i o n  l V . B .  
" Fa i r  Disclusure Regula t ion,; ,  1 7  C F . R. � 243 (2000 ) .  I n  these regu l a t i UJb . t h e  S E C  
h a s  changed co m p l e t e l y i t s  e a r l i e r  pos i t i on o f  supp�)r t ing selective d iscl o s u re t u  
i n vt�stment an a l v�ts . Sec Langc1·oon .  su pra n o te 5 ,  a t  l035-36. 
" Se e  in fra Sect ion i V. A .  
'' See i d .  
'' Securit ies  E. xc h a n gc A c t  o f  1 934 � l 4e .  1 5  U .S.C.S .  § 7Sn( c ) .  
'' U n i t e d  Sti ites v.  O ' H a g a n .  5 2 1  U . S .  642 . 6 7 2  n . l 7  ( 1 997) ( " We l e a v e  f o r  another  
day.  wh e n  the i ssue re q u i res  d e c i s i o n .  t h e  l e g i timacy o f  R u l e  14e-3(a)  ; J S  <lp p i i e d  t o  
'warehous i ng· . . . .  " ) . 
"' See i n fn1 Sect ion I V. B .  
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this model, we will assess the effect of each group on efficient stock 
pricing. In Part II ,  we will analyze the conditions for attaining effi­
cient and liquid financial markets. We wil l  demonstrate that 
analysts provide superior efficiency and l i q u idi ty to financial mar­
k ets relative to insiders. Tn Part IIL we will unveil  and describe the 
positive external i t ies  anaiysts ' compet i t ion gc n e r < i tcs  for the infor­
mation marke t and the inve s t m e n t  ban k i n g  : n J u s t ry .  Finally, in 
Part IV, we will point out and assess the i m p l i c: t ions  of our m arket 
approach for the ongoing de bate about the regul a tion of selective 
disclosure and ware housing. 
I .  THE MARKET MECI-I A N I S ;-..1 
In this Part we sketch out a new model for understanding the 
market dynamics affecting information and i ts impact upon stock 
pricing and liquidity. This conceptualization e nables us to show 
that the choice facing policymakers in regulating insider trading is 
whether to set up an insider-based information market or an ana­
lyst-based information market .  Comparing the two options, we 
observe that the insiders ' market is highly inefficient relative to the 
analysts' market. As a result, efficiency-minded policymakers 
should favor the development of an analyst-based information 
market. 
A .  The J'vlarker Players 
The capitai market consists of four groups of  players: insiders, 
information traders, liquidity traders, and n oise traders."" Insiders 
have access to inside information' 1  due to t heir  proximity to the 
firm. They also have the knowledge and abili ty  to e valuate this in­
formation and to price it. 
Information traders, the second group, lack access to inside in­
formation, but are willing and able t o  devote resources to gathering 
"' For a detai led analysis of noise t raders in c:lpita!  markets. see J. B radford De 
Long et a!.. Noise Trader Risk in financial  Markets, 9S J. Pol .  Eco n .  703 (1990). 
'' We use the term " inside i n formation '· to describe a piece of firm-specific 
information produced within the firm and unknown to the publ ic. After p ublic 
disclosure, the piece of information transforms i n to "public information.' ·  However. 
for claritv"s sake, i n  our a nalvsis we nevertheless cont in ue to rdcr to this i nformation 
as " insid e i n formation,'' traci-ng it to i rs origi ns .  
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and analyzing i n form at ion as a basis  for their t r a d in g .  A l t h o ugh in­
dividual i nformation t raders do not  necess a r i l y  perform a l l  
funct ions o f  i n formed trading-for e x a m p l e .  gathering i nforma­
t i o n ,  processing i nforma t i o n ,  and t r a d i n g  securi t ies-t h e y  do 
p erform the functions as a group.  
I n fo rm a t ion traders are com p ri sed o f  t \\ ( )  s u b-gro ups :  mw!ysrs 
a nd srock tJickcrs. i\ na lysts t1 re expe rts s p e c i a l iz ing i n  p ro vid i n g 
a n a l y t i c a l  se rvices regard ing the value of i nc !i v i cl u a 1  fi r m s  as we l l  as 
t h e  market as a whole . I n  this  Article,  we gro up u n d e r  t h e  t e r m  
' ' a n a lysts "  a wide range o f  pro fession a l  i n vestors  w h o  produce fi­
n a nc i a l  a n a l yt ical  work upon wh i ch they n2se t h e i r  investment  
decis ions . Like t h e  i ns iders ,  analysts have the a b i l i t y  a n d  knowl­
edge to col lect ,  evaluate ,  and pr ice i n form a t i o n .  S t o c k  pickers ,  t o o ,  
col lect  a n d  evaluate i n fo rm a t i o n ,  b u t  they a r e  l ess  effic ient  t h a n  
analysts i n  performing t hese funct ions .  A s  a resu l t ,  s tock p ickers 
are "s lower" at gathering.  a n a l yzing, and respon d i n g  t o  n e w  i n for­
m a t i o n .  a n d  the accuracy of their  evaluations i s  i nfer i o r  t o  t h a t  o f  
a n a lysts . Therefore, s tock pickers oft e n  b u y  i n forma t i on a n d  a n a ­
l y t i ca l  serv i ces from analysts .  
The th ird group, liquidity traders, does n o t  col lect  a n d  e v a l u a t e  
inform a t i o n ;  rather,  t h e i r  i nvestment  r e flects t h e i r  i nd i v i d u a l  a l l o­
cat ion of resources between savings a n d  con s u m p t i o n .  U n w i l l i n g  t o  
devote resources t o  c o n s t a n t  gathering a n d  a n a l yzing of n e w  i n ­
for m a t i o n ,  l iquid i ty  traders,  i f  rat ional ,  w i l l  fol lo w  a s t r ategy o f  
buying a n d  holding a portfo l i o  o f  shares.'12 
F inal ly ,  noise traders, t h e  fourth  group, act i rra t i o n a l l y ,  fol l owing 
d i ffe r i n 2.  m ethods of i nvest m e n t  e i t h e r  as i nd iv i d u a l s  or as a 
group." '
V
Noise traders o ften b e l ieve that  they are i n  possess i o n  of 
valuable i nformation and invest as i f  they a r e  i n fo r m a t i on traders . ' '  
I n  such cases.  other marke t p art ic ipants cannot  separate noise 
traders from true i n form a t i o n  t raders .  
B. Th e Pricing Process 
Insi ders or i nfor m a t i o n  traders de tect d i s crepancies  between 
v a l u e  and p rice based on t h e  information they possess and t h e n  
'' See I laclclock & Macey, supra note  1 5 ,  a t  1 453-54. 
"' See De Long ct a l . .  supra note  40. at 704. 
" Se e  i cl .  
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trade to c apture the value of the i r  i nformational adv an tage ."5 W he n  
the y obse rve u n de r v al uati on, the y buy, the re by rai si ng t he p rice ;  
c onve rsely.  w he n  the y sp ot overv al uati on, they sell. the re by caus ­
i n g the p r ice to d rop .  S ince p ri ce change s are a lway s  comp ared 
with some c <l i c u l a tecl v al ue .  a trade is tri gge r e d  w h e never the p rice 
chanQ.e i s  n u l  warran ted bv t he cur ren tl v  k n uwn i n form at ion .  � - . 
(_l i v� n  th i s  i n \· l� s t rn e n t  s t ra tegy �  t rad i n g  against  a p�l rty \\' i th  s u p!_-� -
rior i nform cl t i n n  wi l l  res u l t  i n  a l oss . 
Liq uid i ty traders ,  w ho t rade i rr e spe ctive of new informati on­
for ex ample .  s e l l i n g  for l iq uidi ty or bu yi ng fo r saving-will trade 
reg ardle�s  o f  t h e  2ct i o n s  o f  i nside rs and i n fo r m a t i o n  t r aders. 1 t  is 
i mp ortan t to no te that insi d e r  tr ad i ng d oc s  not harm l i q u i d i ty t rad­
e rs. '" O bvious l y , whe n i nside r trad i ng has no e ffec t  on stock pri ce s, 
l i q uidi ty t raders will not be harmed.  C ounterin t ui tive l y ,  howeve r, 
e ve n  w he n  i nsid e r  trad i ng d oe s  affe ct stock p rice s  (for e xamp le ,  
pri ces r ise w he n  i n side rs buy) , i nsi d e r  trad i ng d o e s not adve rsely 
affe ct liq uid ity trad e rs." I ndeed,  if l iq uidi ty trade rs tr ade i n  the 
same m anner as d o  i nside rs-for e xample, buyi ng w he n  i nsid e rs 
buy- the y lose since the y could have bought at a l owe r pri ce if t h e  
i nside rs were not buying a s  well. H owever, i f  l iq ui d ity trade rs tr ade 
agai nst inside rs, the y gai n si nce the y w ould have bought for a 
hi ghe r p ri ce abse nt sell i ng by i nsid e rs. T he same i s  true w he n  li ­
q ui d i ty trad e rs sel l .  Liq uidi ty trade rs w ho foll ow the s trate gy of 
buying and hold ing a p ortfoli o d o  not lose on ave rage to e i ther in­
s ide rs or inform a tion traders. W he n  the y buy a p ort foli o. t he y  l ose 
on some tr an sac tions ( w hen the y buy toge the r wi th inside rs or i n­
format ion trade r s) and g ai n  on othe rs (wh e n  they buy w he n  
insiders  o r  i nformati on traders  are se lli ng) . Li kewise.  w he n  the y 
sell  t he p or tfol io. t he y  l ose at t ime s and gain at others .  O n  ave rage 
t hey earn the market return for the per i od of the ir  hold ing. " O n ly 
'' See .  e . !!  . .  E u !! c n c:  F. Fama. R a n d o m  Walks i n  S t ock iVL!rkd Prices. 2 1  Fi n .  
A n �liysh J . .  CScpt .�bct .  1 965. a t  55 (clc�cr ib ing t h e  p rocess by which rnarkt:t prok,;sio n a l s  
i n co r pora te i n forma t i o n  i n  to prices ) . 
" Trad i n g  bv i n format ion t raders a lso docs n ot h a rm l i q u i d i ty t ra ders. 
" Sec l-! � Jddock & \'laccv. supra note 1 5 , at 1 453-54. 
'' I n  o t h e r  wor d s .  the ' ' fa i r  play' ·  or · 'market  i n tegr i tv . . rat iona l e s  do n o t  h o l d  w i t h  
rcga;J t o  t hese i n\·cstors :  Thev do not expect equal  a n d  t i m c l v  �1cccss to i n formation 
a nd i n de e d  they a n: not h a rn{ed by not get t i n g  it .  Cf. Robe rt' J.  H a ft . The E ffect of 
l n > i d c r  Trc1 d i n g  F. uks on the I n te rn a l E fficiency of the Large Corpora t ions.  E:O Mich.  
L. Rev. 1 05 1 .  1 05 1 -53 ( 1 982 ) (expla i n i n g  t h e  " fa i r  play" a n cl t he ' ·rnarkt:t  i n tegrity•·  
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t raders wh ose trades are t riggered by c h a nges in p r i ce will l ose on 
average w h e n  t rad i ng aga in s t i n s i ders or i n formation traders .�9 
Noise t raders a re active but  irratio n a l .  Their a c t i o n s  are h a rd to 
predict . If  they act cornpletely randomly they wil l  c a n c e l  out the e f­
fect o f  each other  on prices .  a n d .  on average , they wi l l  n o t  l ose to 
ins ide rs o r  �' n �1 lysts . '" N o ise  tr ztders . h owever.  c;o met imes act as a 
herd.  They Cii: he bear ish  or bu ! i i sh .  as a gmL :p .  ·wi t h  respect to a 
specific s tock :  �1 p a r t i c u l a r  i n d ustry, o r  e v e n  the rn arket as a 
whole . 5 1  Whether  t hev w i l l  lose t o  insiders or i nforma t i o n  traders 
deoen d s  o n  t h e  t i me i t  takes tbe stock to reach its  est imated t 
' 'va lue"  as calcu lated by i nside rs or i n form::1tion traders .  S uppose 
i n siders anci i n format ion traders are of the opi n i o n  t h a t  t he stock 
I nternet .com is  over-val ue d ,  and t hus,  sell  the stock . Noise traders 
who buy the stock wi l l l ose i f  they b old t h e  stock u n ti l  i t  e v e n t u a l l y  
d r o p s .  But in  t h e  i nteri m p e riod they can earn a p o s i tive retu rn i f  
the stock p rice con t i nues t o  ri se. I n  the l o ng run,  however,  t h e y  w i l l  
l ose,  a s  a group. to ins i ders o r  i n formation traders.  
Inform ation traders cannot di scern whether p ri c e  c hanges are 
caused by n oise traders o r  by i nsiders . 5' When n o i s e  trading is 
m ixed with i nsider trading,  i n forma t i o n  traders c a n n o t  extract i n ­
format ion from vol um e  o r  price m ovem e n ts, n o r  c a n  t h e y  deduce 
the i d e n t i ty of the traders _,_; Thus,  when i nsiders are p e rm itted to 
r a t i on ales) :  H arrv I-k i i c r. C!ziun:lla. S E C  Rule  14c-3 an d Dirks: fai rness versus 
Economic Theory.  37 Bus. Law. 5 l 7 .  555-56 ( 1 982 ) ( m> t i ng t h a t  i t  is doubtfu l  t h:lt 
i nvestors q ue st io n the i n tegrity of t h e  nn rkct due tO k nown c! i fft.:rc n ees in  i n formation 
avai l a b l e  to i nvestors ) .  
,., W i l l i a m  K . S .  W:.1 ng. Trad i n g  un M : 1 tc: r i a i  N o n  pub l ic I n format i o n  on Imperson al 
Stock Ma rke ts : Who b f ! a rm e d  a n d  \Vho C; n S u e  "vV h o m  Unde r S E C  Rule lOb-s·: . 
54 S. C a l .  L. Rev. J 2 l 7 .  1 3 1 1 - 1 2 ( 1 98 1 ) .  
"' Randomizing a h rgc number  o f  t rades has t h e  same protect ive: effec t a s  b u y ing 
<:llld h o ld i ng a port tc 1 l i u .  Huwever.  t h is s tnttegy invo l ves greate r transact ion costs. 
" Sec De Long d a i . .  supra nNe -10. at  704--26.  
" Cf. .  e.g . .  M orris 1\kndclso n .  The Econo mics of Insider Tradi ng Reconsidere d ,  1 1 7  
U. Pa .  L. Rev . 471 J .  47-+ ( 1 969) (book review) ( arguing t h a t  ' · [a J s  l ong as oth e r 
investors do n o t  h �tve t h e  i n fo r m a t i o n  [ t h a t i n s i de rs have] ,  t hey have no reason to 
cha nge t heir  u p i n i o n s  o f  t h e  v a l u c  of the s tock . ·' i rrespec t i ve of noise t r a d i ng).  
" I t is  notewort h y  t h a t  Professors G i lson and Kraakman h ave a rgued that t he 
trading vo l u me or p r i ce move m e n ts may t h e m se lves send a m essage to a n a lysts 
regard i n g  t h e  n a t u re tlt t h e  i n s ide i n formation.  especiallv if some a n a lysts can d e d uce 
the identity of the i ns ide t raders.  Howe ver ,  they have acknowledged that t his me th od 
is the least dficie nt  \\"ay of ach i ev i ng e fficient pricing because this p rocess o f  
' "decoding" i s  i mprecise: and s l o w .  Sec Ro n a ld J .  G i l s o n  & Re i n ier H .  Kraakman , T h e  
Mech anisms o l· M a rk e t  E fficiency.  70 Va. L. Rev.  :549, :574--79 ( 1 984 ) .  We sub m i t  t h a t  
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t r a d e ,  t h ey w i l l  c o n s i s t e n t l y  b e a t  t he i n fo rm at i on traders .  Since in�  
form a t i o n  traders fol l o w  prices and react  to i n form a t io n ,  they w i l l  
a l ways b e  o n  t h e  los ing s i d e . ' '  S uppose an a n alys t .  based o n  t h e  i n­
fo r m a t i o n  ava i l a b l e  t o  h e r ,  be l ieves t h �1 t  a price o f  a ce rtain  s tock 
accurately represe n t s  i t s v a l u e .  Now suppose that  an i ns i d e r  is se l l ­
i n g the s t o c k  bas ,� cl o n  nega t i ve p r i v <H e  i n fo r m a t i o n  s h e  possesses,  
caus ing the stod: price t o  ckcl i n � .  The a n <t i ys L  bc i ll g_  i gnc n a n t  o f  
t h e  i ns ide i n fo r ma t i o n .  w i l l  i n Lc rp r c t  L h i :s  d c c l i n ·.:: a s  a n  tm dc rval ua­
t ion a n d  will  buy the s tock.  The sLoc.k will  cont i n u e.� L u  decl ine and 
o n l y  a ft e r  the n e g a t i ve i n fo rma t i o n becomes p ub l ic w i l l  the a nalyst 
r e a l ize that she bought a n  overpriced stock . Th e same i s  true of 
p o s i t ive ins ide i nform a t i o n .  In !'orm 8 t i o n  t raders  c a n not  d ivers ify 
away t h e  risk of t rading against  insiders .  and t h e y  w i l l  a lways lose 
w h e n  compe t i ng against  i nsiders . '' T h us ,  when i n sider  trading i s  
preva l e n t ,  i n formation t ra de rs vvi l l  be unable  t o  recoup t h e i r  in­
vest m e n t  in i n fo rm a t i o n ,  and eventual ly  they wi l l  exi t  the m a rk et .5' 
our assu m p t i o n  is more rea l i st ic for several addi t ional  reasons.  Fi rs t . it is i mporta n t  to 
n o t e  t h a t  G i lson and Kraakmall ·s  argume n t was mack regard ing a market from which  
noise traders were abse n t .  The addi t ion of n oise t r:td e rs m a k e s  i t  even more d i fficul t 
for a n alysts to isolate i n fo rmed trading fro m  u n i n formed t rad i ng, t h us further  
reducing t h e  eff iciency o f  decod i ng. Second.  em p i r ical ly . t h e  l'cas ib i l i tv  o f  d ecod i n g  i s  
chal l enged by t h e  fin d i ng t h at markets  do not  d isp l ay ' ·,; trong e ff ic iency" ( i .e . .  i nsiders 
d o  outperform t h e  m a rket ) .  See .  e.g . . Juse ph E. Fi nn e rt v , I ns iders a n d  1vl a rk e t  
Effic i en cy . 3 1  J .  Fin .  1 1 4 1 .  ll4S ( 1 976) :  H .  Neja t  Seyh u n .  Insiders '  profi ts .  costs o f  
t rad i ng , and m a rket e fficiency. 1 6  J .  Fin .  Eco n .  l iN, 2 ll ( 1 986). That  i s .  a n a l ysts arc 
unabk to d e t ect the n a t ure o f  the ins ide i n form at ion or tu deduce t he i de n t i ty of t h e  
i nside tra ders d u ri ng t h e  trade s o  a s  tu preve n t  :1 hnurmal  re t urn t o ins iders. S e e  i d .  
M o reove r. even t h e  i n format ion abou t <t l rc: adv executed am! rc p n r t e d  i n s iders ·  t rades 
compo u n ded i n  the S E C's Official Sum!IWIT i.s nnt a lway> exha�1stcd hy an <J ivs ts . See.  
e . g  . . Jd'frey f. JaUc.  Speci a l  i n form a t i on a n d  I ns ide!· Tradi ng. -+7 J .  B us. 4 LD. 428 
( 1 974) (sugges t i ng that  i n ve�tors can pruf i t  i'rum prompt usc or the  Official 
Summorv) .  Compa re Halbert S.  K e r r .  The hattk of i n s i d e r  t rad i ng vs. m<�rke t 
d'fi c i ency.  fi J .  Portfo l i o  M �m t  . . S u m m e r  1 980. at -+7 ( us in � '! st c� t i s t i c a i  ana lvsis to 
show t h ,1t excess returns Gl�l no longer  be ga in ed ) . with R;1, monel G o l d i e  & " Keit h  
Ambach tsheer. The b<m k o f  i ns id e r t ra d i n g  v s .  ma rJ.:et  c fi'ic ic ncv:  Com:nc n t .  7 J .  
Port fol io  i'v!gmt . . Winter  1 9S l .  at  88  (concl u d i n g  t ha t  K e r r 's  re�u l ts · ·sJww t h il t  non­
i n si d e rs con usc the Official Sumn/ilrv t u  e a rn  excess profi t s s igni f ic <1:l l l v  more o ft e n  
t h a n  not ' ' ) .  
" Haddock & MJcey.  SLtpra note 20. al  3 1  S .  
'' See Wa l te r 13age h o t .  T h e  On ly G am e: i n  Town. 27 fi n .  A n a l vsts J . .  1\Ln.-A pr.  
1 97 1 .  a t  J2, 13 ( showi ng that in a mod e l  wi t h  i n formed t raders .  m a r k e t  m'1kcrs, and 
l i q u id i ty  t raders. m a rke t m a k e rs a l ways l ose t o  i n formed t raders) .  
"' Sec.  e.g. ,  M i ch ae l J .  Fishman & K a t hl e e n  M .  H agc r t v . I ns id er t rad i n g  and the 
e ffi c ie n cy o f  stock prices .  23 RA ND J .  Ecun . .  S p ri n g  1 992 . cH l 06. l JO (showing t h a t i n  
a model  w i t h outsiders possessi n g  kss p recise ' � '�d nl<)rt: cost!v i n format ion  than that  
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I n  short .  perm i t t i n g  ins ider  trad i n g  wou l d  l e ad to a market  w i thout 
.:; ]  
a n a l ysts .  
W h e n  i n si ders a re restr icted from tradi ng, the  o u tcome will  be 
d i ffere n t .  We cons i d e r  a legal  rest rict ion on i n s i d e r  t rad ing that  i s  
b a s e d  on t h e  " d i sclose o r  abstain " rule .'' U n d e r  t h i :.;  ru t ·.: .  i ns i d e rs 
can e i t h e r  d isc ! <JS•.: Lhe  ins ide inforrn a t i o n  they po�.;s  .. :· '; ::, ; : ; ' ci t rade o n  
th is  i n fornt a t i o n  l l! ��.t� !. he r  \Vi t h  IhC r e s t  O f  the  lll � 1 rk ;�:- t O r  J bsta in  
from tracl inso  u n t i l  s'o m c  other  le�al Ju tv  forces them t u  cl!:.;c i osc .' ·' � � � 
O nce t h e  i n forn1 a t i o � 1  i s  J i sclosed, insiders a n d  i n for i t� d t ion  trad�rs 
compete to capt u re the value o f  the i n form a t i o t1 .  i n i i i �t i l y .  t h e r e  
will  be  o n l y  a fe\v a nal ysts in  the market who wi 1 l n: a k e  a b n ormal  
ret urns on i nvest m e n t  i n  i n form ati o n .  I n  t h i s  t ra n s i t i o n  peri o d ,  t h e  
m arket  w i l l  be t ess  e fficie n t  a n d  less l iquid i n  compa rison w i t h  t h e  
prece d i ng s tage i n  w h ich i ns iders were a l lowed t o  trade ."') G radu­
a l l y ,  however ,  the n um ber of a n a l ysts w i l l  i ncrease a n d  compet i t i o n  
am ong them w i l l  b r i ng down t h e  return on i n v e s t m e n t  i n  i n forma­
tion to a compe t i tive rate, thereby creat i n g  a more efficient and 
of a n  i nsider , the n u mber of  i n formed outs iders dec l ines as � �  func t i on o t  t h e  rc!;J t ive 
precision of the i nside r:;' i n form a t i o n ) :  Hayne E.  Leland, lnsickr Trad i ng : Shou ld  It 
Be Prohibi ted?.  l O l l  J .  Po l .  Econ .  859. 883-85 ( 1 992) (conc lud ing t h a t i n  a model wi t h 
moiwpol i s t i c  i ns iders [l\)Ssess i ng more prec i se i n fo rmation t h a n  i n lnrmed \lUts ick rs.  
the  wel fare of i n formed u u t s id e rs always decl i nes when the i ns i ders arc tr<Jciing ) .  
" Evc:n i f  one  ;ls,umes that  an a lvs ts can  "decode" ins ider t racl i n �  or clecl uce the 
i d e n ti tv of t h e  i ns ide t raders .  it is clear th a t t h is process or dccoJ i ng i> s low. cos t l y ,  
and i mprecise. Thcrc!'ure. the e ffect of decoding on our an;1 lvsis w i ! l  be: mcrdy 
q u a n ti tat ive:  D· ..:cucl i n g w i l !  o n iy a ffect the degree w wh ich in� id ·; rs \\' i i i  d ri ve: a n a lysts 
out o f  the  market-ra t h e r  than zero a n alysts,  th e re \Vi ! l  be a .f(� t , ·  idt .  Yet.  the  process 
\VC d escribed abuvc rcn-:a i n s  v a l i d .  In our ana iy·sis. \VC < 1ssun1e ze n: d e cud i n � i n  order 
t o  h igh l ight l llc. te nsion h� t wct:n i ns iders and a n a ly;:;ts .  
'' \Vc t �1 k c:  w; given the c ur re n t  regim e prohibi t ing ins iJc:r l r : t d i n g  For a :; i �n i fi can t 
propl"lS<t l to i n1p rove the  ex i st i ng regi n1e .  sec J e�se �d . Fri � d .  R c d u c i n � the 
P ru ti t ctb i l i t v  o f  Corpo n l tC i n s ider Tr ad i i�g Through Prc t ra c! i ng D i :;c t l l:' UIC,  7 1  s� Cal .  
L. R e v .  :o r n .  306 ( i 9(,'8) ( advocating  a rule t h a t  requ ires i ;; �; i ck r:; t u  d i sc J ,,sc: t h e i r  
i n tended tra nsact i u n :; pr ior to t h t� i r  execltt ion ) .  
5'1 -Thc d i�closc-or-�l h :=; t �l i n  r u l e  docs  n ot p rescr i be n p[t rt i cuLn 1 1 n1 i ng fu r d isclo:-\ u rc .  
Rat her.  t h i s  ru le  permits  ccch ind ividual firm to adopt i t s  o-.vn Ji :-;c :cburc poiicy from 
the pnmiss i b k  range ckl i nc:.Hcd by mcmdawry d isclus u rc ruie,; .  
· " Sec genera l ly  Reza u !  Kahir & Theo Vcrrnaekn, lnsider trading restr ict ions and 
t h e  stock m a r k e t :  Evidence rrom the A msterdam Stock E:<change . .:+() Eur.  Ecu n .  Rev. 
l :i 9 L  1 5 9 1  ( l ':.l96) ( e xa m i r� i n g  the effect s ince l. 987 of i n t ro d ::c in�  i ns i d e r  tra d i ng 
restri c t ions  on t h e  bc!w··.· ior  of the Amsterdam Stock E xchangc , , n c!  t' i nding t hat 
" -;tocks be ca me l ess l iquid" and  t h at t h e re w a s  some ev idc.: n cx o t· d ;�·� d u c t i o n  ' · in  t he  
�; rock rnarket · � spc�cd o f  adj ustn1ent  to  posit ive e �trn i ngs 1 1C\VS . .  ) . 
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l iquid  m ar k e t .' 1  I n  this m arket ,  h owever ,  due to the i r  superior 
skil ls ,  analysts wil l  beat  stock p ickers. Valuing i n format ion t r ad i n g  
o v e r  l i quidi t y  t rad in g , b u t  ack nowledging t h e  superiority o f  a na­
lysts,  stock p i c k e rs w i l l  respon d by buying ana l y t i c a l  services fro m  
a n alysts .  w h o  w i l l  s e l l  rhese service s at a cornpe t i t ive pr ice .  
I f  on l y  a fc? \\' i n s i d e rs occas ionally v iolate  t h � : r ·�� s t �· ic t i c) n  Ll n d  
t rade o n  i n s icic  i n !"o rnt a t iorL the  a n a lysts �  rn ar�:c t  C ( ! n  :_.; t i l l  fu nct i ·J � i .  
S uch l imi ted i n ·; i d e :  t rad i ng dimin i s h e s  to  s o m e  e ': l c n ;  the  c : ­
pected return  o t  a na lysts b u t  l e a v e s  them a sufl:ic ient  r e t mn to  
re m a i n  ope rat 1 v c . · The  e :.: tent  o f  ins ider  trad i n g  � e h  the o o u n d <; ­
r ies  o f  t h e  a n a l ys t< m 2 rket .  Whe n t h e  exte n t  o f  i n si d e :· t r a d i n g  is  
l i mited,  a competi t ive ana lysts'  m arket  wil l  deve l o p :  w h e n  i n s i d e r  
t radi n g  i s  extensive , no  analysts'  m arket will form ."' T h i s  subst i t ut i on 
e ffect betwe e n  i Ds idcrs and a n a l ysts i s  the key to u nck rstanding t h e  
b a n  o n  ins ider  t radi ng. 
Market pr i ces are the result o f  the acti o n s  of a l l  fou r  groups.  In­
s i d e rs and i n form a t i o n  traders follow market prices and counter  
d e v iat ions  from t h e i r  calculated s ubje c t i ve ' 'value . . , L i q u i d i ty trad­
e rs who fo l low t h e  buy and hold stra tegy d o  n o t  d ist ort prices 
because other m ar k e t  participants do n o t  assign i n forma t i onal c o n­
tent  t o  t h e i r  t ra di n g  activ i t ies . N oise  traders,  o n  acco u n t  of t h e i r  
irrati o n a l  i n vest m e n t  s trategies,  distort  price s .  Thus,  t h e  accuracy 
of  s t ock prices depends o n  the abi l ity of insiders o r  i n form a t i o n  
traders t o  coun ter  the acti ons o f  n o i s e  traders. Th e bet ter  i nforma­
ti on t raders or i nsi ders are a b l e  t o  counter price devi at i ons caused 
by n o i se t raders  or b y  ne,.v!y disclosed info rm a t i o n .  the more effi ­
cient the  marke t .  
l n  l ight o r  I h is rnarket  rn o d e L  and given the go a !  df m a x i m iz i n g  
t h e  e ffi c iency and l iq ui d i ty o f  finan ci a l marke ts ,  the q u c: s t iun  be­
carne�·; \Vhich group�i nsiders or an alysts-is better �t b lc  to atta in  
this goa l ?  
"1 C f.  Fish man & Hagerty.  supra note 56. a t  l 07 (arg u i ng t h a t  · · i n ,; i Lk r  t r � 1di ng le: tds 
t o  k�:s e ffi c i e n t  stock prices ' ' ) . B u t  sec Beny. supra note 27. a t  6 ( fi n d i ng that  " wea k e r  
i n s i d e r  trad i n� rcg in1 <�S  h :·tve . t..)n  a v e: rage. l ess l i qu i d  e q u i t y  lll<.l rkcts ' ' ) .  
" Sec J h inyoung S h i n .  The Optimal  Regulation of l nsick ;  Tr: 1d i ng. 5 J .  Fin.  
l n t c r m c d i a t i u n  -+9 . .+9 (!  996) (consid e r i ng the opt i m a l  e n force m ,� n t  dfun '  c1n d  costs 
i n  a model i n c l u d i ng i n ,; i d ers, i n formed m a rket p rofess io n a l s .  ami l i q u i d i t v  t raders 
reveals  that " to k rat i n g  s u m c  i nsickr t radi ng ca n be t h e  o p t i m a !  reg u ! a t t ;rv  !"J ! i cy''). 
"·; ld. i.l t  59. 
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T l . EFFIC I ENT AND LIQU ID MARKETS 
In this  P a rt , we analyze t h e  con d i t io ns under  w h i c h  ca pi t a l  mar­
kets are e ffici e n t  and l i q u i d  and expl a i n  the importa n c e  t o  the 
economy o f  at ta i n in g t h ese goals .  I n  the fol lowing Sect ions ,  we 
d e monstra t e .  contrarv to conve n t ional  wisdom . rhat  a n a l vsts a re " " 
s uperior to ! n � i d c L'  i n  p r o vi d i ng effic iency a n d  l i q u i d i t y  to fin a n c i a l  
mark e t s .  I n  t h e  r-erT1 a in d c r  o f  t h i s  Art icle,  w e  draw o n  t h i s  i m po r­
tar1t insight  to  p rovide :1 new economic j us t i ficat ion for the b an o n  
i n s i d e r  trading. 
A Wh en A re Markets Efficien t  and Liquid? 
Markets are e ffic ient  when prices accurately reflect  a l l  avai l a b l e  
i n formation regar d i ng t h e  assets traded in the  market ."4 A t t a i n i n g  
effic ient  pric ing  i s  cr uc i a l  fo r achieving efficient  a l locati o n  o f  re­
sources in the economy ."; Among other  things, effi c i e n t  pr ic ing is 
importa n t  for t h e  market for corporate control ,  for m o nitor ing a n d  
controll ing the man agem e n t  agen cy problem ,  for t h e  a l l ocat ion o f  
resources t h rough i n i ti a l  p u b l i c  offerings ( " IPOs")  a·nd secondary 
offer ings, for keeping h igh  l i quid i ty  i n  the  market ,  and for  o t h e r  
transactions i n  t h e  economy t h a t  re ly  o n  market  prices ."" M arkets  
are l iquid when t raders can execute transact ions speedily .  The 
more l iquid a m arket ,  the  faster  a t rading order i s  executed.67 Liq­
uid markets benefi t  the economy as they reduce the cost  of 
transacting and the risk associ ated with i nvestme n t ."x 
" See !vbrce l K a h a n .  Sccuri t ie'  Laws a n d  t he Social  Costs of " I n accurate' ·  S t o ck 
P ri ces .  41 D u k e  L. J .  977.  979 (1 992) (describing th is  s t a t e  as o n e  w h e r e  · · t h e  m a r k e t  
price o f  a s t o c k  cc>rrc�ponds to i t s  fun da m e n t a l  va lue") .  
6 ;  Sec genera l l y  i cl .  (describing the value o f  e ffic ie n t  stock p rices a n d  various 
regulations t h a t  attem rt ro promutc e ffic iency ) .  
'' See  i d .  a t  1005- 1 7 . 1 0 1 7-24. 1 028-34, 1 0l5-39 (d iscussi n g  capi t al a l loca t i o n .  
market l i q ui d i t v .  t h e  po te mi a l o f  management beco min g  overly c o n c e rn e d  a b o u t  
maximizi n g  t h e  va l ue o f  s t o c k  rat h :.: r  t h a n  t h e  value o f  t h e  corpo ra t i on . t h e  n ;;turc o f  
t h e  m a rk et for corporate con t rol  a n d  h o w  i n effic ient  s tock prici ng m ay a ffect i t .  and 
other problems o r  i n e ffi c i e n t  stock prices).  
6 7  See id.  a t  1 0 19-20. 
" See i d .  at  1 020 (descri b i n g  the two social  costs of l o s i n g  l i q u i d i ty as t h e  
' · transact ion co� ts  o f  t rad ing[  ] a n d  t h e  c o s t  o f  h o ld ing n o n-optimal p o r t fo l i os' " ) .  
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For marke ts to be e ffic ie n t , inforn1 <1t ion about the value of firms 
b . d . 1 I . I . 1 · "� m u s t  e mcorporater qu1cK y ancl acc u rate y mto stoc.( pnces . 
This process invo lves  t\VO different  tasks :  o roduction of informa-
• l 
tio n  and pricing of i nform a t ion .  Production of infonnarion i n volves 
searching for currcni 1y  unkno\vn i 11 forrnation that affects prices.  
fJricing q�f in.f'nrn ?orion req t i i res  a f H·Dces� of ana lyz i n g  l nforrn.a t ion  
in  o r d e r  to deterrn i 1 1 e  i t �) va l ue .  :;cj t h c.t t  o ne n1c1y then trade. based 
on discrepancies bct\v�.-:: c n  p rice and \'a lue. 
Production of info rm a tio n  involves two different  types o f  infor­
mation:  firm -specific i n formation and general market informat ion .  
Finn -specific infomzarion i ncludes information about  various at­
tributes of the firm , such us the q usl i ty of its m an agement, its 
business plans and past record, its financial  position,  and the suc­
cess of the firm's resea rch and deve lopment e fforts.  General 
market information includes inform ation about the gen erai condi­
t ions in  which the firm functions, such as the prospects of 
cornpetitors, the indus t ry as a whole,  and the local  and global 
economy. 
Pricing information comprises t;,vo dist inct functions: a nalyzing 
i nformation and trad i ng . A nalyzing information requires analyzing 
both firm-specific  and general market information.  Firm-specific  
information cannot be accurateiy pr iced i n  isolation. One cannot 
evaluate t h e  future prospects of a corporation without knowledge 
about t h e  estima ted course of  the local and global economies .  
Trading is the act  by which inform ation is communicated t o  the 
market. Trading can l <lke o n e  of t1vo forms:  d i rect trading or indi­
rect trading through recommendations and advice 10 ot hers. 
For m arkets to be liquid ,  there m ust exist  sufficient trad i n £  to 
e nable m ost  buyers and se l l e rs to consummate transactions expedi­
tiously . Liquidity is  achieved as a resu l t  of  three pri ncipal  r-easons: 
portfolio adj ustments,  consumpti onlinvestmem adjustrnents, and 
divergence of opi n i ons. '" Portfolio adjustnzenrs provide liquidity by 
causing const ant  changes i n  the composition of portfo1 i os to bring 
them in conformity with i1westors ' predeterrn i n e d  levels  of risk and 
''' See Gi:son & K raak m a n .  supra note 53 (giving a comprehensive descri pt ion of the 
processes by which markets  <l t t a i n  e ffici ency) .  
7 0  H·ans R. Stol i ,  A l t ';�rnat ivc '-/ie,vs of �v,fa rkct  �·.tfaking� in r•,.:Iark�t i\.�ic.king ar:d the 
Ch anging Struct ure of the Securi t ies  l n d u s t ry o7. 67-68 (Yakov Arnihud C! al. eds . . 
1 985) .  
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return .  This k i n d  of  trading i s  r a n d o m  among i nvestors .  Consump­
tion/in vestment adjustments create l i q u id i ty by effe c t i n g  s h i fts  of 
fun ds from i nvestment t o  consum p t i o n  and vice versa.  This k i n d  of 
trading i s  random when i n d i v i d u a l s '  d e cisions t o  red uce o r  i n cr ease 
savings are uneorr elated,  but i t  i s  nonra ndom \\ hen spurred by 
t re nds in the cconorny (for e x a m pl e . reduced s a v i n fo l l owing a 
recc?ss ion ) .  Uivcrgence of opinions among m ark," l  p l a y e rs cre a t e s  
l i q u i d i ty b y  promp t i ng market  p L:tyers wi t h  lo\Y C r  v :l l u �l t i o n s  t o  
t r ans act w i t h  i n vestors w i t h  h i g h e r  v a l u at i o ns .  Th is  k i n d  o f  t r a d i n g  
is  p a r t l y  random a n d  part l y  n o n r a n d o m .  Discre pan c i e s  betw-een 
price a n d  v::: l ue v is-a-vis  noise  traders can be either  r�: n c!om o r  n o n ­
random depe n d i n g  o n  h o w  irra t i o n a l l y  noise t raders b e h av e .  
D i v e rgence of o p i n i o n  among a nalysts  i s  spread a l o n g  a spectrum 
with  some degree of  correl a t i o n  s ince valuat ion me thods s h a re 
m a n y  common ch aracter is t ics .  
B. The Relative A dvan tage ofA nalysts o ver insiders in  Pro viding 
Efficiency and Liquidity 
1 .  Ejficiency 
Productio n  o f  general  m arket  i n forma t i o n  i s  costly. I t  requires  
searc h ing,  sort ing,  a n d  organiz ing i n forma t i o n  from a wide range o f  
sources.  I ns iders h ave n o  advantage over a nalysts i n  produci n g  
general  m a rk et i n forma t i o n .  O n  t h e  contrary.  a n a lysts e nj oy 
economies o f  scale and scope i n  performing this  task .  K n o w l e dge 
gai n e d  wit h  respect to o n e  corpora t i o n  in a part icu lar  i ndustry c a n  
o fte n be used w i t h  respect t o  a n o t h e r . a n d  k n owledge p e rt a i n in g  t o  
t h e  e c o n o m y  as a w h o l e  i s  u s e fu l  i n  a nalyz ing a l l  corpor a t i o n s .  I n­
s iders do not  c haracteri s t ica l ly  produce ge n e r a l  market  
i n forma t i o n ,  and i t  is reasonable  t o  assume t h a t  they wi l l  buy s u c h  
i n format ion from a n al ysts . 7 1  
Nor do i nsiders h ave an advant age with  respect t o  pricing gen­
eral  market  i nform a t i o n.72 Here,  too,  i t  is  reasonable  to  assume t h a t  
7 1  As d iscussed la tn i n  th is  Article, analysts wi l l  prubdbly br: furced o u t  o f  the 
market .  I t  is un l ike ly that  the sale of  generz,) market  i n fo rm a tion to ins ick rs would 
generate suffic ient  returns to sustain a compet i t ive ana lyst mark et .  
-, One oft-ci tt:d e:-; Jmpl c  is the fa i lure  of ins iders to foresee the  October 1 987 
market  crash. Sec: H. Nejat  Seyh u n .  Overreaction or Funclamtn tals :  Some Lessons 
;o· o - l - 1 J On Insider Trading 1 247 
ins iders will  buy pric ing services from a nalysts.  S t i ! l .  ge nera l  ma r­
ket i n formation t h a t  is produced and priced by a s i n g l e  a n alyst  who 
sel l s  h e r  s e rvices to i ns iders  wi l l  be i n fe r i or t o  genera l  market i n ­
form at ion th a t i s  prod uced an d p r iced by n u m e ro u :s a n a lysts  
opera t i n g  in  a compet i t i v e  m arket .71 A na l ysts enjoy  �� g 1 •.:a ter  c o l ­
l ec t ive i n forn·l a t iun b�tsc \vhich gives then1 a gre a t�-:: r ! i � -..: ! ih t--,ncl o f  
p r i c i n g  accura te ly  gi \·r.: n  t h e i r  uncorrc l a t c d  d i lfe r i ng \ ' c·t l u � t t i <J ! i S .  
Prod u c t i o n  o f  fi rm-�; peci fic i n form at ion i s  a byp rod uc t  o f  m a n <lg ­
ing t h e  corporat i o n .  The m o r e  bus iness ch a n ges  o c c u r .  the  m o r e  
fi r m-specific i n form <H i o n  ex i s t s .  The cost o f  p r o d uc i n g  fi rm-sre c i ti c  
i n form ation has t w o  compon e n ts :  creat i n g  bus i ness  c h �l ngcs  a n d 
l ea rn i n g  ab ou t them . N a t ur a l l y, a n a l ysts can no t 21fcct  bus i n e ss de­
c is ions ,  so they must  l e a rn of c h a nges after they h ave occurred . 
Conseq uent ly ,  a n al y s t s '  product ion costs e q u a l  t h e  r e s o u rces spent 
on di scoveri ng firm - spec i fic information . 
I n s i d e rs .  i n  con trast ,  c a n  both affect bus i ness deci s i ons and s i ­
multa n e o usly " l e arn "  about t h e m .  vVe call the  first L!c t ivi ty 
' · i n formation-producing m anageme n t . "  What i s  the cost of i n for­
mat i on-p roduc i ng management?  W hen i n sider trading is prohib i t ed , 
i ns i de rs '  i nvestm e n t  i n m an ag ing the firm is a funct i on o f  t h e i r  
com pens at ion p ackages a n d  t h e  e ffectiveness o f  the appl icable 
mo n i tori n g mechanisms. I t  i s  against this  benchmark that  t h e  cost  
of i nform a t i o n-producing management s hould be m e asured . As­
sume t hat under a restri c t i o n  on i ns ider  trading, i n si de rs wil l  i nves t 
$ 1 00 in m an aging the fi r m  and the value of the firm w i l l  be $ 1000. 
When i ns ider  t radi ng is  pe rm i t t e d , i n s iders \Vi i i  invest  addi t i o n a l  
reso urces ,  o r  d i vert exist i ng ones,  to cause busi ness c h anges t h a t  
i ncre ase t h e ir  t rad i n g  opportuni t i e s .  Ce rta in l y , i n  i h is  case . m ore 
fi rm-specific i n formation wiJ! be prod uced.  Bm what  is  the  cost o f  
t h i s  a d d i t i o n a l  i n fo rm a t i o n ?  This question cannot be <1 nswerecl i n  
the  abstract .  S ince i n s i ders m a y  create additiona l  t rad ing  opportu­
n i t ies e i ther  by m a k i ng poor bus in ess decis i ons or sound •J n e s .  one 
m ust consider  the tota l  e ffect of t h ese deci s i o n s  to determine  the i r  
d esir a b i l i ty. Assume that in si ders invest $20 i n  order t o  gain $30 i n  
from Ins iders'  Response t o  t h e  1Yl arket Crash of 1 987, 45 J . .  Fi n .  1 363 ,  1 36.1-6-1 ( 1 990) 
(concl ud ing from an examinat ion of aggregate insider tran�;act iuns t h a L  the  l 987 crash 
was largely unant ic i pated ) .  
' ' Set: G i lson & Kraak man .  supra note 53. at  5 8 1 .  Th is  i s  the •.:s.c,c n er: P l  t h e  efficient 
capi ta l  mark ets h ypothe�;is: that n cl a nalyst wil l  be able to  beat the m a rket  p rocess. 
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traclino mofits .  The $20 investment may be in addit ion to the $ 1 00 ::::> .'l 
previously Invested in managing the firm or i t  may be part of it i f  
resources c:.re n o w  d iverted t o  increase trading opportunities .  In ei­
ther  c a s e ,  r h . is  is  n o t  the oniy effect  of the policy c h a n ge :  The val u e  
of  t h e  firrn \VOL:ld be affected a s  \vel l .  1'he value o f  t h e  fir1n rn ay go 
dov.::n � S �lY to SSOU� or go Li. p .  sc;.y ! t) $ 1200. rfh�t t  i s .  the  at ternpt  to 
cc1ptur�; .:..l! ... ��E t iona !  t rad i ng prDfi -r:; cc;u ld  e i ther  i nc rc. c1��c o r- dccre::t: ..�e: 
the ··.;(� l ue of  th �.:: t"irrn . \v i t h  no relat ionship to thr: trading profi ts .  
Assurning the pote n tia l  for trading profits fron1 pour aiH..l beneficial  
business ch2ci:>1Uns  is  equal,  the expected addi i i o n a l  ·val ue front in­
fotTn c.tit;n- p,·uducing management will be zero. The exact effect o f  
permitting ir�sider trading would ultimately depe:1d o n  the c o m ­
pensation schemes and monitoring mechanisms i n  each specifi c  
fi rm. Thcref•.)re,  for t h e  purpose of  our analysis , w e  assume no  i n ­
formation· producing management-that i s ,  t h a t  management 
decisions are not distorted by the desire to produce firm-specific 
information .  
W e  are left wit h  the "learning" cost of  insiders. Because i nsiders 
are an integral part of management ,  the marginal costs of obta i n i ng 
firm ·spec i fic information for insiders is zero. Moreove r ,  the costs of 
gather ing and organizing such i nformation (for example, account­
ing) are borne by the corporation i n  the regular course of business. 
Theu:fore , no incentive is required to motivate insiders t o  learn of 
and process firm-specific inform ation .'• Consequently, i nsiders 
have an advantage over an alysts i n  producing firm-specific i n for­
mation .  FlO\vever.  Lhe rnore firm-specific i n form<1 tion i ns i de rs 
disclose to t h e:- rnarke t �  the less reS(1Urces analysts '.ViE have to ex­
pend tc this end.  First ,  the discl osure duties placed em i nsiders, 
apart frorn restrict i ng inside r  t r a d i ng�  red uce the analysts'  costs uf 
proclt�cing fi.rn1-,specific in forrr1at ion . ':-; Second,  even \vithin the dis-
7 -l  Thr:sc fl:c: !s  �L�ggcs1 t h a t  t h e  lcga! system should not gra n t  i nsiders a prop�rty right 
or any nthc"C p r •. •pri::� ra.ry e n ti t1crnent  in the i n forn1ation.  Sci� /\.n t h ony 1� .  Kronrn::·! iL 
�v'1 is t<�ke .  I:: i � cl',:':� urc.  In ftJrn1ation �  i Jnci the: L�=t\v of C o n t racts. 7 J. Legal Stud .  l ,  1 3-- ! .:� 
( 1 972;) (c rguing U1at � ) n e  \Vht) deli berately acquires i n forn1ation rnust be a nc)\vcd Lo 
benefit  frcrrn i L ,  b�i t  that  there is no nr.::ed !O protect  i n [onr1 a t i o n  2cqui red ;:Jsu. a l l y  
withour c; dei it·c ratc and costly senrch ) .  
'' Sec.  e . g . ,  Dougic iS \V. Diamond ,  Optimal Release o f  Information by Firms, 48 J .  
Fin.  I U7 L  107 1  ( 1 9S5)  (demonstrating th:H w h e n  the cost of relc::!sing ir.lorrna.t ion to  
t h e  firrn is  lD \\·::.:: r rh,�n t h e  aggregate expend itur� incurred by investors to ::�cquire the 
infonn;,t ion i n dependent ly ,  wcifarc is en hanced i f  the firm discl oses the i n fo r m a t i on ) .  
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cre t i ona ry boundaries set by the m a nd a tory d i sc los u re regul a t i ons,  
the prese nce of a n a l ysts  causes corporat ions t o  adopt m o re reveal­
ing disc l o s ure pract ices .  S ince a n alysts  are repe a t  p l ay e rs i n  the 
capital  m a r k e t  and can reward good and reve a l i n g  d isc losur e  prac­
t ices  and p u n i s h  restr ict ive ones.  corporat ions h ave an i n c e n t i ve t o  
a d o p t  r ·.� \ e a l i n g d iscl osure prac L i ccs .7'· Thus.  at  the e n d  o f  the d a y .  
i n s i d e rs ·  �l c! V< � n t age ove r an alysts ,  i n  t h i s  r(�:; p c c t . w i l l  he m i n i m �1 l .  
As  fm : i s  p ri c i ng fi rm -speci fi c i n form a t i on i s  concernr::d ,  i n s i d e rs 
e njoy �! rc a t e r  pro x i m i t y  to t h e  fi r m · s  business,  hut t h e y  lack objec­
t i v i t Y .  N�..: ve rt h e lcss .  t h e  co nve n t i o n a l v i e w  m a i ntains  t h a t  i n s i d e rs 
h ave a b e t t e r  u n de rsta n d i ng o f  t h e  fi r m ' s  b us i ness .  T h i s  ass u m p t i o n  
e quates s u pe r i or access w i t h  superior pr ic ing a b i l i t y  w h i l e  ignoring 
the pro b l e m  of  l ack o f  object iv i ty .  T h i s  view is  based on e mpir ical  
f indi ngs that  ins iders constantly outpe r form t h e  m arket .77 However,  
t h e  abnormal re t u rns of i n s i d e rs do not necessarily i n d icate t h a t  
t h e y  a r c  b e t t e r  t h a n  a n alysts  a t  pr ic ing f irm-specifi c  i n fo rm a t i o n .7' 
Firs t ,  i nsiders use fi rm-specifi c  i n format ion a ft e r  a n a l ysts h ave 
priced all ava i lable gen e r a l  m arket  i n form a t i o n .  If i ns i de rs h a d  to 
price both types of i n format ion s im ul taneously ,  their returns would 
l i ke l y  be much lower .7y Second, i n s iders enj oy two advan tages over 
'" Analysts c1n punish companies that engage in restrictive disclosure practices by 
reco m me nd ing to th e i r cl ients t h a t  they se l l  t h e  stock of such co m p a n ies-<1 
recomm e n d a t i
.
LJn t h a t  may ca use t h e  stock to crash .  This i s  very s i m i l <lr to t h e  " "\Val l 
S t r e e t  ru le . · ·  
" Sec F in nc: rt y. ,; upra n ote 5 3 .  �> t 1 148: Sevh u n .  suprJ n o t e 5 3 .  J t  2 1 0- l l .  
'·' Cf..  e .g  . .  Sugato Chakravany & Joh n J .  McCo n ne l l . Docs I n si d e r  Tra d i n g  R e a l l y  
M ove Stock Prices":'. 3-l  J .  fin. & Qu<Jntitativc A n alysis 1 9 1 ,  l lJ l  (1999) (<1na lyzing th·� 
' " t rading �Kt i v i tv or a cnn fcsscd i n s i d e  t rader, [v�: m  Bocsky, i n  c�nn a t i o n 's stock just  
pr i or to Nest ie "s  ! 904 acquisit ion o f  Carnat ion."  a n d  fi nd i ng that  " o ur tests �He u nab l e 
t o  d i st i n g ui sh t h e  pr i ce effect of Boesky" s ( i . e  . .  i n furmt: d ) p urc h asc>s o f  Cm1 :H1un .,, 
stock !rum t h e  e ffect of n o n - i ns ider  ( i . e . ,  u n i n form e d )  purch ase s " ' ) .  Thi,; result  
we a k ;.; n s the cLJim that i ns i d e r  t ra d i n g h as a b e t t e r  price d i scovery p rocess. 
" As e vide nce t1l this likelihood . one may compare the  lowe r ret u rn s  o f  ins iuers in 
l arge firms-in which the ab i l i ty t o  have a substa n t i a l <Jdvantage ove r firm-specific 
i nformation i s  l i m i ted a nd m acroecon o mic factors h ave ;rre a t e r  i nfl uence o n  f irms·  
performan ce-w i t h  t h e  h i g h e r  returns of i nsid e rs in sm� l l  firms.  Th is co m pa r i son 
su ppo rts om c l a i m . Sec.  e .g. , Th om as Gosne l l  ct a ! . ,  B an k ruptcy a n d  I ns i de r Tra d i n g :  
D i fferc:nccs B e t ween Exchange-Listed and OTC F i rms , 47 J .  Fi n . 349, 361-62 ( 1 992) 
(finding that insiders i n  smaller non-listed firms were t he h e a v iest net sel le rs pri or to 
bankruptcy. while weaker results were obtained with regard to insiders i n  lmger listed 
fi rms ) :  S e y h u n .  supra n o t e  5 3 .  at 203 (de monst ra t i ng t h a t  i nsi d e rs in smal ler  fi rms 
tend to t rade  o n  fi nn -spec i fic i n format ion,  wh i l e  ins iders  in larger fi rms , who are l t:ss  
successful pre d ictors of the i r own firms ' p e r form<J n ce ,  te n d t o  trade more on t h e  basis 
1 250 Virgin ia Law Revie 1v  [Vo l .  87 : 1 229 
a n alysts :  t imi ng and im muni ty  from outside competi ti on."'  Insiders  
c a n  use firm-specifi c  information be fore ;:malysts  gain access t o  in­
forma t i o n  without  fac ing any  compc L i t i ,)n  from outs iders .", Thus ,  
insiders' abnormal returns arc not necessa ri ly the product  o f  supe­
rior t �1 l e nt o r  skin and d o  not  indicat t"� r h �: r  they are be t ter  at  pricing 
fi rn1 -specif ic i n forr-r: a. t i c.:n . ·<� F�athcr .  t h ;· ·; :�: (' rc: t u r n s  are quasi-
of m acrueconomic factors): id .  at  20 1 ( ohsc: rv i n c:  t h a t  · · i ns ide rs i n  s mal l fi rms e a r n  
s u b s t 8 n t i a i ly  grea t e r  abno rrn � ! l  cosrs o n  t h e  u n i i."n !!lh :d tr ::-t d c r:-; t h a n  t h e  i n s i d e rs in  
la rge firms' ' ) .  
I n  (ldcl i t i on . a s t u d y  o f  i ns i de r trades i n  t h e  U s l o  S t ock Exch ange -wh i c h  i s  a l ess 
e ffi c i e n t  exch a nge com pa rc.d w ; t h  t h c: m a r k e t '  in t h �� U n i te d  S t a t e s-·'d ur i n g  a pe ri od 
of lax  enforceme n t  of i ns i de r  trad i ng regula t ions 
. . fo u n d  t h a t  i nsi ders earned "zero o r  
ncgat iw: abnormal " re t u rns a;-:d we re outpcrt'ormcd bv nwtu31  funds.  B .  Espen Eckbo 
& David C. S m i t h ,  The Cond i t ional  Per formance ut ! n :, ider Trades, 53 J. Fin.  467. 467 
( 1 998) .  Simi l a rly , a s tudy of the p ro fi tabi l i ty  ( ) f  i n s iJer  t r �1d i ng on the Vanco uver 
Stnck Exchange-also a icss  effici e n t  m a r k e t  t h c; n  the m a r k e t s  in the United States­
"wh ere it m i gh t he a rgued t h <1. t t here are l a rge i n fo r m a t i o n a l  asym m e t ri e s , "  found 
t h a t ,  "despi t e being able to i den t i fy part icular  prufitablc i ns i der trades,  t h e  i ns i de rs do 
not, over a l l  thei r t rades. outpe rform the o utsiders . . .  Robert Heinkel  & A l a n  Kraus. 
The e ffect o f  insider trad ing on average rates o f  ret ur n ,  20 Ca n .  J .  Econ.  588, 588 
( 1 987) (emph as is om i t ted ) :  see Ro n a ld J. Danie l s  & J effrey G. M a c i n t os h . Toward a 
Dist inct ive Canadian Corporate Law Regi m e .  29 Osgoodc Ha l l L.J.  863, 873-74, 877 
( 1 991)  (noting that C.1nad ian m arkets a rc i l l i q u i d  and less •effic ient) ;  Jeffrey G. 
M a c i ntosh.  The Role o f  Ins t i tu t ional  and R e t a i l  f nvestors in  Canad ian Ca pi ta l 
Markets, 31 Osgoodc Hall  LJ. 37 1 . 384 n.-+8 ( 1 993 ) (noting that  Canadian markets are 
i i l i q u i J ) .  
"' See, e .g . .  Stephen H. P e n n: �m .  A Cump<�riSl)n ul t h e  I n form a t i o n  Content  of 
Ins ider Trading a n d  Managt·mc: n t  E a r n i ngs Furcca�; ts .  20 J .  Fin.  & Q u a n t i t a t ive 
A nalys i s l .  l ( 1 985) ( propnsin�. i h a t  the ti m i n g  of  i n s i ck r t ra ns<Jcti ons re l at ive to 
vo l un tary e a rn ings i'orccash is .  i n  <tllll o f  i tse l f. a ''<t iuable piece o f  informatio n):  
S t e p h e n  !-! .  P·c nma n . Insic!ct· Tr�; d i ng and Disse m i n a t ion of F i rms · Forecast 
In forma t i on . 55 J. Bus. 479. 49 ! ( 1 982)  ( fi n d i n g  t h a t  regi:,tc recl i ns iders t ended to buy 
( se l l ) t h e i r  firm's shares i n  the pniod i m m e d i < t t e l y  prece d i n g  favorable ( u n favorabl e )  
e a rn ings �; n nounccme nts a n d  tu s e l l  ( b uy ) s h �t rc:< s h u rt l v  a fter Lt vo rable ( un favorable)  
a n nounce m e n ts .  co nc l uc! i n ;e t hc!l  i ns i ck rs usc t he i r  fcn·ccc; s t  i n furrn�l l ion in  tra d i n f(  and 
t ime t he i r trades relat i ve t':� th e  forecast  date ) .  
-
" We assume t h a t  i nside rs in top posi t i ons ctrc abic to avoid competiti on not j ust 
from outside a nalysts b u t  from ot her i nsiders as wdL I ndeed,  em pi rical studies reveal 
t h e  existence of an informationc t !  h i erarch\' e frcc t  among Ji fkrent i ns i d e r  groups. Sec, 
e.g . ,  Ken n e th P. Nunn Jr .  et � d . ,  A rc s o m e  i n s ide· ;·:; nwrc · ' i n si d e ' · t h an o t h e rs') ,  9 J .  
Po rt fo l i o  M g m t . .  S p r i n g  1 983. a t  l S . 
·'' Indeed,  i nsiders a r c  only �thk to bc t tc r "predict  .. /urge l l r  wzcxpccred ch an ges . Sec, 
e.g . . John E l l i o t t  e t  al . .  The .L\ssoci a t i on between l nsider Trad i n g  ancl I nform a tion 
A7l�ounceme nts,  15 R�ncl J. Eco n .  521 , 528--30 ( 1 984) (obse rving--that  the strongest 
ev ide nce of i n format ion-rel a t ed t rad i ng occurs around earnings ch a nges , part icularly 
for small  fir ms) : James H .  Loric & V ic to r  N i c: Lic dwfre r. Predict ive and S t a t ist ical  
Properties of  I nsi de r Trad i ng.  l l  j .  L. & Eco n .  35 .  4o-4 7 ( ! 9o8) ( posi t i n g  that i n s iders 
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m o n opo l i s t i c  ren t s ,  ste m m in g  from the i n s iders ·  e xclusivity over 
n o n p u b l ic i n formation.'-' 
I n  s u m ,  i ns iders are not superior to a nalyst :;; i n  producing ge n e ra l  
market  i n for m a t i o n  or i n  p rici ng i nforrnat i on--b,� i t  firm-spe c i fi c  
o r  g e n e ral  m a rket  information.  
' !.. iquidirv 
t t  i s  \�.r idc l y  agreed t hat  j n s ider  t radi ng di rn i ' :�� l iq u � d i Ly .  · rh i s  
v ie\v i s  based on a theore t ica l n1odci  thtl t  suggc:)t �� thJ t  rnarket  
m a ke rs 'N i l l  oflsct  t he risk o f  tr ad i n g  ag::t i nst i ns i d e rs by i n cre a s i n g  
the bid-ask s p r e a d . ' '  A l t h o ugh the  increc1 sed b i ci-:. tsk S Jire<:td  a rgu­
ment is  s u p port i ve of our view, we do not  w;m t  to h clse our analys is  
so le ly  on t h i s  argum ent for two reason s .  Firs t .  t h i s  i s  not  t h e  o n l y  
exist i n g  m o d e l  i n  the l i t e ra ture. A com peting  model  s ugges ts  that  
marke t  m akers can b e t t e r  compensate t h e m s e l ves by reduci ng the  
b id - ask spread a n d  i ncrea s i ng t h e  vol u m e  o f  t r<H..l i ng."' Second, e m ­
o ir i c a l  s t u d i e s  t h a t  t e s t  t h e  impact of ins ider  t rad i n Q.  o n  the  bid-ask 
�prcad provi de indeterminate  resu l ts . "  
� 
are supe r ior forecasters of l arge-greater t h a n  e ight  percent-changes i n  t h e  pr i ces of 
their  own firms).  
" For an example u r  ins i ders using i n form8t ion to th<:: i r  ach a n i<tgc at t h e  e x pense of 
the p ub l i c . see J i -Chai  Lin & John S.  Howe. Ins i de r Tr;Jd in�  i n  t h e  OTC Market.  45 J .  
Fi n .  1 273.  1 283 ( 1 990) ( ri n d ing t h a t  ins iders consist e n t l v  made the righ t pe rsona l 
weJ i t h  maxi miz ing decis i o n :  thev rdraineJ from rurchas ing stuck u n t i l  a ft e r  t h e  
release Df  u n fa\·orabk i n format ion a n d  from S•: l l i :1g stock u nt i l  <t ftt:r favorable  
i n fo r m a t i on wa� re leased ) .  
,, Sec, <:: . �  . . B al'.c hot,  s u pra n o t e  5 5 .  a t  1 3 : Lawr.:nce R .  C l us lc n ,�\: p,; u i  R. M i l grom. 
Bid . ..-\ sk �<! n c! "rr,msaction Pri ce s i n  ;� Spcci <l l i s t  \:Li r k •: i  w i t h  f k t e ro ge n e�ouslv 
I n formed Traders .  l 4  J .  fin.  Ecun.  7 1 . 72 ( i 98 5 ) .  O n e  �> ; i g h t  ;nguc· t h ;; t m a rket m a ke rs 
wo u l d  not  be d r ive n u u t  o f the market  as a rc:suit u l· i nside'! tr: 1d i n g  because t hey could 
prutcct  t h c n1�e ! v:::-; by adj us t ing  t h e  bid-ask :=;prcltJ.  \V h i lc ; h i s  n: :-� :.- b.:. t rue .  on ly  a 
s m a l l  port ion uf e� nalysts are mark e t make rs. and <: \ e n  t h is s m a l l  ptT , tect i n n  wo u l d  
c o m e  at the cost  u f  i i q u i J i tv. 
'' Sec  Thomas .1 . George c:t  a l . .  Trad i ng Vol ume and Tr<� <h< tct iun Cosh in Specia l ist 
!vl arkets. ·l9 J .  F i n .  l -tS9. 1 498 ( 1994). 
'" Com p<lre Kce H .  Ch ung & Charl i e Charocn wung. lm;der  Tr; t d i ng and t h e  B i d ­
Ask Spread,  33 ;:-in .  R e v  . . A ug. 1 998. at  J. 1 7  (esw biis i l i ng t h ;t t  .. a l tho ugh speci a l ists 
may not be able to detect  i n s i de r  t r a d i ng i n  a t i m e l y  fa:;h ic :l .  thcv p:otcct  t he mselves 
i n  a gen e rai wc;v wi th  wider spreads for stocks wi th  crD�s-sect iun; i ! lv  higher ins ider 
t rad i n g " ) ,  wi t h  Bradford Corn e l l & Er ik R .  S i rr i . The Re;;ct i u n  u f  i n ve st ors and S to c k  
Prices to Insider Tra d i ng. 47 J. F in .  103i. l032 ( 1 992 ) ( f i n d i ng t h a t  i nsider trading 
s ur ro u n d ing t he acq u is i t ion o f  Campbel l  Taggart hy /, n h e u :;,; r -B u�;ch did not res u l t  in  
widening or bid - ask spreads ) ,  and Omcsh K i n i  & S h ·: h z,,d ;vr i a n .  Bid-Ask Spread and 
Own e rsh ip S t ruct u re .  L S  J .  F i n .  P.cs .  40 1 .  404 ( 1 9lJ:'i i ( li n d i n g  " rw evi de nce o f  a 
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\Ve argue that the focus o n  the i m pact  of ins ider trad ing  on t h e  
b i d- e1 s l-.:  p�· ices ,  as determined  by an un inform ed market m a k e r  who 
trades against i n formed insi ders,  myst i fies  the an a lys is .  The u n i n­
for m e d  marke t maker faces t h e p robl e m  o f  asym metr ic  
i n form�t t i o n  when trad ing  e i t he r  aga i n s t a n a l ysts  o r  agai n s t  i n s i d ­
e rs L•, , t ! !  g i"Cl ltps  h : tve o.n i nform a t i o n  <.:· d�c: . Il uwe ve r. t D d i ng by 
i n s i d c: r�; i m p:Jses < t  much gre a t e r  r i :.; k u 1 1  t h e  u n i n l'o rmcd m d r !-.: c t  
m a k r..: r. l n s i c! c rs .  clue t o  the i r  exr:: l u s i v i t v  O\ C i' i n s i d e  i n fo r m �H i o n .  
can m a n i p u l a te th e t iming and  volume of the i r  tra cks . <1 f2ct which 
incre��scs the r isk of the un informed market  m a k e r  tradi ng a ga i ns t  
the m .  B y  con t rast , ana lysts, even when e n j oy i n g  a n  i n form a t i on zl l  
a u v a n tc tge , w i l l  a l ways ho ld  diverging o p i n ions as tu  t h e  e xact  im­
p a c t  of  the i n format ion on stock prices ,  a n d  t h e i r  t rade  orders w i l l  
t h e re fo re d i v e rge from one anoth e r. This,  i n  t u rn,  reduces i h e  r isk 
faced by the un i n form ed market  m a k e r .  In  add i t i o n ,  because ana­
lys ts face compet i ti on  fro m  other an a lysts ,  they cannot  !l1<tn ipu l ate  
o r  t i me t h e i r orders. Thus, t rad ing by ana lysts presents  the un i n ·  
formed market maker wi th a much lower r i sk  re la t ive t o  trad ing by 
i n siders. 
Furthermore,  the relat ive l iquid i ty e ffects of ins iders and  ana­
l ysts can be analyzed i ndependent ly o f  the react ion o f  the 
un in formed mnrke t maker to informed t r a d i n g .  Assume a market  
without market makers, as i s  the case in  severa l  European  coun­
t r i es ."  Trading in  such marke ts occurs t hrough d i rect matches 
b e t w e e n  buyer and se l ler'' with i n i t i a l  l i qu id i ty  provided by  inves­
tors and noise traders.'v Would i ns iders prov i de gre a t e r  oddirional 
l i q u i d i t y  relat ive t o  ana lysts? We contend th a t the c i e 2 r  answer i s  
no .  First, ins iders have only one  subj ective vai u a t i o n  o f  the  corpo­
rat ion .  \Vhen the price equa ls  this va luat ion ,  ins iders w i l l  not 
trade .'" In a compet i t i ve an alyst s ' m a r k e t  t h e re i s  a w i de range of 
pusi t i \·e relat ion between bid-ask spread and i n s ider  owners h i p  .. and f i n J i n g  ' ·no 
rc l a t i nn between spread and insidcr trading'' ) .  
· ' The Paris  Bourse.  for i nstance.  
'' T h i s  i s  a t radi ng system k nown as conril/ ltOIIS douhl.: uu criuu n w rkers ll'ir/; o w  
dcsignurcd !uarker makers. The operation a n d  c fl'cc ts  of  t h is s y s t e m  arc q u i t e  s i m i l ar 
to t h a t  o r  a cunt inuous market  with  designated market  m a kers .  s,.::c: S t o l l .  supra note 
70.  a t  73 .  
" 1  Sec  id . 
.. , I n d e e d .  o n e  study has  fo und t h a t  t h e  stro ngest c\' i ckncc of i n forma t i o n-re l a ted 
t r< tding occurs a ro u n d  u:1espcctcd e a rn i ngs ch�1ngcs.  E l l i o l l  ct a ! . .  supra n o t e  82, at 
528-30. S i m i l a r l y . A l bert S.  Kyle shows t h a t  i n  a m o d e l  with " ;1 s i n gle risk neut r a l  
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d i ve rgi ng, s u bj ective val u a tions .' ' '  c:onsequently,  there is a m uc h  
gre ater  pro babil ity t hat a t  any given t ime a s ub-group of  analysts  
w i l l est inBte that  t he p r i ce deviates  from the va l u e .  Therefo re . 2ln 
a na lyst s '  m arket  creates gre a t e r  opportuni t ies  for tradi ng . 
Sec o n d ,  i : 1 s i dcr�  are re l uctant  to hold stock i n ve ntories t h <1 t  w i l l  
e n able t h e rn L n  p r o v i d e  l iq ui d i ty beca use t h e y  [: rc risk-averse �t rHJ 
hold u n d i \·c r·� i r · p o r t fcd i u s .' <: �rb c i r  huiTl a n  cap i t a l  is i n ve ::: l �..: cf i n  
t h e  corpt)rat io i: .  a n d  th t..: o n !y \:vay t h e y  c a n  d ive rs i fy is h y  p l ac i ng 
their fin a n ( i a l  cap i l a i  c l sc\vhere . . For t his rea �) o n ,  they \V i l i  be re l uc­
tant to i n ves t  t h e i r  s a '.,; i n gs i n  the same corpora t i o n .  A n alysts .  by 
con tras t . h o ld d ivers i fied portfo l ios a nd a dj ust  t h e i r  portfo l i os fre­
quen t ly , \Vhich enables  them to provi de greate r l iquidity .  
Third,  ins i ders have l im ited res o urces  re lative to the ana lysts·  
m arke t .  Si nce the value o f  inside i nformation i s  u n ce r t a i n ,  i t  is d i f­
fic u l t  to borrow aga i n s t  such i n form ation.  Moreover,  it is d i ffi cult  
to sel l  such informa t i o n  t o  i nvestors d ue t o  t h e  i n herent  confl i c t  of 
i n terest between i ns iders a n d  o u tsiders.  Once i n s i de i n form a t i o n  i s  
sold,  insiders can d i m i n i s h  a n d  even destroy its value by manipulat­
i n g  corporate decis ions and business act ivit ies .  A n al ysts as a group 
have greater  fi nancial reso urce s ,  and they are able to sel l  the i r i n ­
formation to  i nvestors w i t h o u t  t h e  confl i c t  o f  i nterest  problem.� '  I n  
sum, because of t h e i r  gre a t e r  number o f  d i ffering s u bj ective valua­
t ions ,  their  s uper i o r  fi n anc i a l resources, and t h e i r  diversi fied 
holdings,  analysts w i l l  provide greater l iq u i d i ty to fi n an c i a l  m arkets 
than wil l  i n s i ders.  
C. jnsidcrs · J:xclusivi(v or A nalysts ' Compelition 
As s h own a bove .  i n s i ders cio not have an i n h e rent  adva n tage 
ove r  analysts i n  su pport i n g  effi cient and l iquid m a rkets.  Tntroduc-
i n s i d e r .  r�tndnrn n o i��  t ra d e rs �  a n d  con1pc t i t ivc r1sk n e u t ral  n1arkct  n1�1 k c rs ."  Lhc 
o p t i m �t l  t rncling k •:ci fnr  the i ns ider i n c reases with  va ludprice d i ffere n t i a l .  Alben S.  
Kyle .  Con t i n uuus  A u c t i ll n S  a n d  I ns i d e r  Trad i n g ,  53 Eco n o m e t rica 1 3 1 ) . .13 1 )  ( 1 (J8) ) .  
'Jl S c �  Farn:: . s u p r a  n u l c  45 .  a t  5 6 .  
'" Carl ton & Fisch e l . surra n o t e  14.  a t  368. 375-76. 
'" O t h e r  cun i'l ic t>  of i n t erest .  however.  s t e m m i n g  from t h e  com p l i cated r e i a t i D ns h i ps 
between an�t l ysts aml man agers. m i g h t  tamper w i t h  ana l ysts ' object iv i t y .  Sec 
Langevoon. suprr, n o te .5.  at  1 0-W--44: Roni iVlichacly & Kent  L. Womack. Con rl ict , , f  
Interest a n d  t h e:  Credibi l i t y  of U nd e rwr i te r A n alyst Reco m m e n d a t i o n s. 1 2  R e v .  f i n .  
S t u d .  653 . (J)3 ( I  0')0)  (fi n d ing t h a t  . . recomme n d a t ions by underwriter analys ts  shuw 
s ign i fican t e ': idencc of bias . .. suggesti n g  ·'a  pote nt ia l  confi i c t  o f  i n te rest i n he r e n t  i n  t h e  
d i ffe re n t  funct i u n '  t int i n vestment  ban kers pe rform .. ) . 
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ing the fact  that i ns iders e nj oy virtual  exc l us ivi ty over i n s i d e  i n for­
mation complete ly  t i l ts t h e  sca l e i n  favor o f  the an alysts . '!" G r a n t i n g  
i n s iders p roperty ri ghts i n  i n s i de i nfo r m a t i o n  confe rs u p o n  ins i ders  
a virtual  excl us i v i ty over t h e  pric i n g a n d  process i ng o f  t hi s  i n fo rma­
t i on . 
The fact that  i n s i d e rs face n o  subst : ; m \ :_ : \  com pet i t ion  d i m i nishes  
e ffic ie ncy in  t\VO r ;:: a t rn s :  the  S<.l l c: \ -i f  t"l r· E11 - :.; f> c_: c i fi c  i n forn1 a t i o n  and 
the provis i o n  o r  e ffic ien t  pr ic ing and l i L: u i d i t v  t o  speci fic s t o c k s .  B e ­
fore s ubs t a n t iat ing these  c l a i ms , lwwe '/er. we: need to  address two 
p r e l i m i nary iss ues : why t h t: re levant  rn a rkd for de term i n i n g  i n sid ­
ers·  market  pO\w� r  is e a c h  spec i fic s tuck . ::mel w h y  i ns iders  a s  a 
gro up a r e  l ess com pe t i t i ve t h a n  a n al yc; t s  as a group .  
O n e  m i g h t  argue t h at d ue to s u bs t i tu t ion a m o n g  i n d i vi d ual  
stocks,  the demand for e a c h  i n d i vi d u a l  s tock is  perfe c t l y  e last ic ,  
a n d  h ence i t  i s  the s tock market  as whole  that  s h o u l d  b e  t h e  foc a l  
p o i n t  o f  t h e  analysis  rather  t h a n  eac h  individual  s t o c k .  T h e  m a i n  
reason for the subst i tut ion effe c t  is  t h a t  s tocks a r e  fungi b l e­
c haracterized o n l y  by risk a nd expect ed return. Consequ e n t l y, the 
individual  c h aracteris t ics of a n y  i ndividual  s tock can b e  r e p l icated 
b y  p u rchasing a portfol io of  several  oth e r  stocks."s Therefor e ,  in­
vestors c a n  subst i tute i n e ffi c i e n t l y  pr iced stocks w i t h  i ns u ffi c i e n t  
l i q ui d i ty for o t h e r  stocks.  
This  argument  runs i n t o  two problems: The f irst  i s  theore t i c a l  
and t h e  second i s  empirica l .  T h e  th eore t ical  defi c i e nc y  o f  t h e  per­
fect  subst i t u t i o n  arg u m e n t  is  that i t  assumes a p e rfect l y  e ffi c i e n t  
m arket alre a dy i n  e qu i l ibriu m .  Th is t h eory adopts a s t a t i c  v i ew o f  
t h e  m a r k e t  and does  not  concern i t s e l f  with the process b y  w h i c h  
m a r k e t s  a t t a i n  effic iency. As e x p l a i n e d  e ar l ier ,  m arkets become ef­
fic ient  t hrough a dynarn ic  process t h a t  i nvolves spott ing devi a t i ons 
b e tween value and pr i ce and correct ing t h e m .  Therefore , from t h e  
vantage p o i n t  of inform a t i on traders.  the relevan t m a r k e t  i s  t h e  
specifi c  stock to vv h i c h  t h i s  process i s  applied at  a n y  g i v e n  t im e .  
T h e  e mpir ica l  flaw o f  t h e  pe rfec t  subs t i t ution argu m e n t  s t e m s  from 
·;., For a d illcrent m o d e l  �ipplying the  s�unt: i n ';ight  to t h e  i m pact of i n s i d e r  t r a d i n g  o n  
l i q uidity .  s e c  N i c h o l a s  L. C eorgakopoulos.  I ns ider  Trad i ng as a Transact ional  Cost: A 
M ar k e t  M icrostructure Just ifi c a t i o n  and O p t i m ization o f  I ns ider Trading Regulation , 
26 Con n .  L. Rev. 1 ( 1 993 ) .  
S e e  Danid R. Fisch e l  & Dc ;vicl J .  R o s s .  Shou ld  t h e  Law Pro h i b i t  " !V! an i pu l a t i o n "  
i n  F i n a n ci a l  M a r k e t s ? ,  ! ( ) 5  I l a rv .  L .  Rev .  503 . 5 1 -l  ( l 99 l  ) .  
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t h e  fact t h a t  i t  i mplies n o  correlat ion between price a n d  v o l u m e .  
T h e  m arke t pri ce rem a i n s  cons t a m  ; · ,:;gard iess o f  the qu a nt i ty o f  
stocks t raded . Empirical  s t u d i e s .  however. found m a n y  incidents o f  
· · pri ce pressure , ·' i n d i cat ing t h a t  t here i s  no pe rfect subst i tut ion 
<l m o n g  s tocks.  In oth e r  worcls ,  the denn n d  c urve fL)f specific s t ocks 
slopes d o..,vn\vards t"roLr1 ! e ft �o rl �.:h t .  
i n  i i gh t of  t h e  f�1ct t h �- 1 1. t h e re due�  n t : l  s\.� 1�: rr. t o  b(� J.ier fcct  substi­
tu t ion  a m o n g  s tocks.  �n: J  give n the  �1\ n �\ m i c  precess by which the 
market atta i n s  e ffic iencv.  the i ns iders ·  m a rk e t  power sho u l d be 
measured relative to t h e  rel evant sto·::k. not  the market :1s a whole . 
Even i f  one accepts  that  the  re l c \·:m t market  is e2ch individual  
s tock,  i t  may s t i l l  be a rgued t h a t  imr< t -fi rm cornpe t i t ion among i n ­
siders would create a m arket as co mpe t i t ive as t h a t  of the ana lysts . 
This argume nt  der ives  from the fact that  i n  m a n y  fi rms th er e  are 
n um erous in s i d ers , and com pe t i tion 2 m o ng them wil l  p rovide the 
same e ffic iency and l i q u i d i t y  as compet i t ion among a nalysts .  This 
argument is  problematic for severed reasons.  Fi rs t , in m a n y  cases, 
the employees at  the bottom of the corpo ra t e pyramid only have 
access to small piece s  o f  i nformati o n . They do n ot see the ful l  p i c­
ture tha t  can on ly be s e e n  by the m a n agers at t h e t o p .  As a resul t , 
the employees at t h e  bottom c a n n o t  compete effect ively w i t h  their  
m a nagers in  capturi ng t h e  value o f  the i n format i o n .  Intra-firm 
compet i t ion  based on e mp l oyees holding diffe rent  p ieces of the 
p uzzle i s  i n fe rior to competit ion a m ong < m a l ysts w i t h  similar s e ts of 
i n form at ion .  
Seco n d ,  the i n tra-fi rm compet i t ion argument  assumes that  i nt r a­
fi rm compet i t i on among i n s i de rs wi l l  act ual l y  occur.  \-Vhen in s ider 
trading is open to every o n e .  hO\ve ver. t he man agers, w i s hing to 
rn axi mize their  return s .  will  i m pose V ct r ious restr ict ions on the ir 
s ubor d i n ates to preve n t  i.hem from t rad ing  on ins ide inform a t ion , 
thereby cur t a i l i ng 2ny po t e n t i <il  i n t ra- fi nn compet i t ion.  
''" See.  e . g . ,  Rich ard :-\ .  G o u t  h .  The' l:::J fic i c: n l  \ Ll rk e t .  Portfolio Theory.  and the 
Downward Sloping Demand H ypui h ·c:< is .  61-: N . Y . U .  L. R ev . 1 1 87 .  1 1 90-91 ( ! 993) ;  
J o h n  Lintner,  The A ggrega t i on o r  f n ,·esto r's D i v e rse J udgment'  a nd Preferences in 
Purely Compe t i t i ve Secur i ty  Markets. 4 J .  Fin.  & Q u a n t i tat ive Analysis 347, 384-87 
( 1 969 ) ;  Joram Mayshar. On D i v e rgence of O p i n i o n  and I mperfections i n  Capital 
M arkets,  73 Am. Eco n .  Rev. 1 1 4 .  1 22 ( 1 ')8.1 ) ( i l l usrra t ing the downward sloping 
curvc) ;  Andre i  Shic ikr, Du Demant.i C:u r,·es i•x St ucl-:s Slope Down') .  4 1  J .  Fi n .  579.  
588 ( J 986). 
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Th ird,  even assuming a legal  r u l e  barr i ng m anagers from restrict­
ing ins ider  trading by their  subordinates ,  intra-fi rm competit ion 
w ill not be as effic ient  as inter-analyst  compe t i t i o n .  Intra-firm 
competit ion wil l  harm the firm beca use i t  undermines t h e  fi rm 's 
abi l i t y to control i ts i n te llectual propert y  and i t s  disclos ure pol icy .  
;\c l i n g  t o  rm:ximize their  ga i ns . e m p l oyees ·wi l l  d i m i n i s h  a n d  e v e n  
dest roy the v a l u e  of intel lect u a l  pro p<e: n y�such  < : s  re:;e arch and 
dc:e l cp m e n t  results,  trade secrets .  � tnd �.ens i t ive n egoti at ions--to 
the fi rm by prematurel y  disclos ing t h i s  i n formation t o  t h e  m a r k e t  
t h rough trading.  Furthermore,  the i n formation flow withi n  the f irm 
wil l  be h i ndered,  prevent ing valuable i n formation from reaching 
the m anagement i n  a t imely fashio n .  U nable to  restr ict  i n s i de r  trad­
i ng by employees contractual ly ,  man agers wil l  waste resources to 
prevent trad i ng by their subord i n a t e s  by other means (either to 
protect the firm 's i n te l lectual property o r  their own potent ia l  prof­
i ts ) .  For i nstance , m anagers may fire va luab l e  employees for 
trading on i nside i nformation under the false preten s e  of  i nade­
quate j o b  p erformance.  I n  both cases,  the f irm wil l  be harmed,  
e i ther  due to damage to i ts  i n t e l lectual property o r  d u e  to t h e  
wastefu l  enforcement efforts o f  the man agers. 
Having demonstrated that e ac h  specifi c  stock is the relevant 
market and that i n tra-firm competi t ion i s  i n ferior to competit ion 
among anal ysts, we can now present  a n d  a nalyze the two i neffi­
c iencies  associ ated with granting ins iders  property rights to i n s i d e  
information.  
1 .  Inefficient Provision of Firm -Specific information and the 
Problem of Intertwining Pricing and i'v!wwgemen t 
To see the i nsiders'  adverse imt:JJ.ct on the p rovis ion of fir n1-
spcc ific i n formation, one must focus o n  the stock p ic k e rs who value 
i n formation trading over l iquidi ty  t rading.  As a result ,  stock pick­
e rs create a demand for  firm-specific i n formation .  S e e m i ngly,  this  
demand may be satisfied e i ther  by an alysts  or by i ns i ders .  For the 
reasons discussed above, though , i n s i d e rs w i l l  hoard firm-specific 
i n formatio n ,  and o n ly analysts wil l  supply th is type o f  i n formatio n  
to stock pickers.  Assume t h a t  insider tradi ng is  a l lowed and a na­
l ysts exi t  the market,  leaving the i nsiders as the sole source of  f irm-
·n Sec supra text  accompanying notes 70-7 3 .  
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speci fic i nfor m a t i o n .  E c o n o m i c  t h e ory suggests t h a t  because i ns i d ­
ers can capture t h e  full value of i n s i de i n forma t [ o n  t hrough trad i n g ,  
th ey w i l l  c h a rge s t o c k  p i c k ers supracom p e t i t i ve pr i ce s  for t h i s  i n ­
form a t i o n .  B u t  the c ase a t  h an d i n troduces a n  a d d i t i o n a l  
' n t e rest ing t w i s t  t o  t h e  s ta nd a rd story.  
I ns i d e rs w i l !  d isclose i n s i d e  i n fo rrn <! t i o n  to the m a rket  onlv a fk r  
t h e y  h elve e x pl o i ted i ts v a l ue t h ro ugh t r C�cl i l<g .  R e a l i z i n g  th is ,  stock 
r i c k c: rs w i l l  cease to trade on i n fo rrmH i o n  �\ n ci becom e .  i n  con trast 
to t h e i r  i n i ti a l  pre fere n ce ,  l i q u i d i ty t rad e rs . An a tt em p t  to s t ri ke <1 
d e a l  be tween stock p i ck ers a n d  i ns i d e rs to  huy u n e x p l o i reci fi rm­
SDeci fic  i nfor m a t i on w i l l  fa i l  for two reasnn s :  t h e  i n h e re n t  con fl i c t  
j 
o t  i n terest o f  i n s iders v i s-a-v i s  stock p i ckers a n d  t h e  pu b l ic good 
c hmacterist ics o f  i nformati o n .  
The first pro b l em stems from t h e  a b i l i t y  of i n s i d e rs to d i m i n i s h  
or e v e n  destroy t h e  va l u e o f  t h e  i nfor m a t ion s o l d  b y  a ffe c t i n g  bus i ­
ness decis ions .  I nsiders can n o t  promise not t o c han ge business 
d e ci s ions owi n g  t o  t h e ir fi duc i arv d u t i e s :''' t h e y  can o n l v  comm i t  not ..___.. .I "' J 
to t rade on inside i nform a t i o n .  T h i s  comm i tm e n t  wil l  n o t  e l i m i nate 
their  i n c e n t ive to destroy t h e  value o f  th e  i n fo rm a t i o n  s o l d  because 
c hangi ng bus iness d e c i s i o n s  create s t i l l  o t h e r  opportun i t ies for se l l ­
i n g  the nevvly " p rod uced" i n format i o n .  To e l i m i n a t e  t h e  ins i d e rs '  
ince n t i ve to destroy the va l u e of th e  i nform a t i o n  aft e r  i t s  sale,  i n ­
s i d e rs wil l  h ave t o  m a k e  t h e  twin com m i t m en ts t o  abstain from 
trad i ng on fu tu re non pu b l ic i nfor m a t i o n  and to abs t a i n from s e l l i n g  
such fut u re i n form a t i o n  t o  a di fferen t buyer.  I ns i de rs w i l l  m a k e  
t h e s e  com m i t m e n ts o n l y  i f  t h e  expected profi t  from i ns ider  t rad ing 
is l o w e r  than t h e  ex pect e d  p rofi t fro m  the  sa l e of t h e  i n forma t i o n .  
H o w e ver ,  whe n e ve r  t h e  i n format ion i s  s o l ei w n um e rous i nvestors,  
compe t i t ion among them wiil  res ul t  i n  a lower aggregate re turn 
from trad in g  than  t h e  return that  the i n s i d e r  can make.  More ove r. 
l i mi t i ng t h e  sale to o n e  group of buyers w i l l  prese n t t h e  v i r t ua l l y  
i m p ossib l e t a s k  o f  try i n g  t o calcu l at e  t h e  prese n t  va l u e  o f  al i  fut u re 
trading profi ts from firm -spe c i fi c in form a t i o n . Furtl1 e rm ore,  sell i ng 
the i nform a t i on to a s in gl e  b uyer w i l l  j us t re p l ace o n e  t rue i ns i d e r  
w i t h  a n o t h e r  " art ific ia l  i n s i d e r , , ,  and ,  e v e n  assu m m g  a o n e - t i me 
"· · One couiJ a rgue that  i n s i de rs could o lTer �tock p ickers compe nsat ion for future 
changes a ffe c t i n g  t h e  va lue  of the  i n formation sol d .  D o i n g  �u.  however .  is i rr a t i o n al 
for i ns iders who could have cap t u re d  t h e  e n t i re va l uc of the:' i n formar ion t h rough 
1 r a d i ng. 
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sale of all  fut ur e  fi rm-specific i n format ion i s  poss i b l e ,  t he d e m an d 
of stock pickers for i nfo rm a t i o n  w i l l  st i l l  n o t  be sat isfi e d .  
T h e  second probie m ,  the  n a t ur e  o f  i nform a t i o n  as a p u b l i c good.  
i mp l i e s  that  i ns iders w i l l  not  be ab le to capture the e n ti re value of 
the i n format ion by se i l i n g  i t .  As a publ i c  good , the  v a l ue of i n i'or­
mat ion is m ax i mized when i t  i :�. d i ss e m i n a t e d  to any person \\· h u  
v d l ucs  i t  pos i t i �/ c l .y--- i n  C) U r  :: � �S t� .  �t l l  stock p ickers .  I n s i ci ,.: rs ,  h c; \\ · ­
c vcr�  c a n n o t  s i n 1 u. l t aneous ly  re� tch a l i  the r o tt: n t i (d buyers o f  t h e  
i n forn1a t ion  and cb(-trge t h e r! � .  i ns iders c a n  reach subgroups o f  b uy·­
c rs .  for c:xamplc ,  by a s a k  tu a te lev ision s t a t i o n .  but  t h i s  w i i !  n u t  
generate a return gre ater t h a n  t h e  return from i nsider trad i n g . 
'vVhen i n s i de r  tra d i n g  is proh ib i ted,  i n siders cannot t r a d e  o n  
fi rm-specific i n form a t i o n ,  n o r  can they s e l l  such i nform a t i o n .  Con­
sequently,  i ns iders have n o  i n ce n t ive t o  destroy t h e  v a l ue o f  fi rm­
specific i nfor m at i o n  t h a t  i s  disclosed to the market .  I n  the abse n ce 
of preemptive compe t i t i o n  from i n s iders,  analysts w i l t  e n ter t h e  
m arket .  Lacki ng the abil i ty to i n fl u e n ce business decis i ons,  ana lysts 
cannot destroy the value of disc losed i nform a t i o n .  Moreover, op­
e rating i n  a competitive m arket,  a nalysts cannot appropri a te the 
e n t i re value of the i nformat ion;  they w ill only recei ve a c o m p e t i t ive 
r e turn o n  t h e i r  i nvestm e n t  i n  i nfor m a t i o n  e i ther  t hrough trading or 
t h ro ugh sales to stock p ic k e rs .  In any case, a m arket for i n forma­
t i o n  wil l  develop and t h e  stock p ickers'  demand for i nfo r m a t i o n  
wil l  b e  satisfied.'" 
2. Inejf/cient Pricing and Reduced Liquidity 
Comparing i n s i de rs a n d  analysts as t\vo al terna tive s uppl ie rs o !  a 
service-provid ing e fficie n t  pricing a n d  l i q u i d i ty t o  a specific 
stock- reve als that  the  i n s i ders.  being relat ively immunized from 
compe t it i o n ,  w i l i  provide inferior s e rvice at a h igher p r i c e .  
Absent rne a n ingfu l  compe t i t i on ,  i n s iders w i l l take var ious  ac­
t i o n s  to e x p l o i t  a n d  protect their  unique m a r k e t  pos i t i o n .  F i rs t .  
ins i ders v<� il l util ize the i r  posi t i o ns with i n  their fi rms to i nt1u e n ce 
·--·-- ·---------- ---
9"1 As w i l l  be e x p l a i n e d  la ter ,  the  compe t i tive in formation m a r k e t  a ffected by 
analysts creates a posi t ive exte r n a l ity for s tock pickers who value inve s t i ng ba:;ed on 
rree l v  disclosed i n formation over l iqu id i ty  t rading. Although the e fficient  m<l rkci 
t h c o rv su�!.g·:sts t h i s kind o f  t n1 d i n g  can n n t  be profi table ,  m e re t rad i ng creates u t i l i  tv.  
U n d e r  t h is v i e w .  these i n vesto rs can be laheied as noise traders. 
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busin ess activit i e s . 1w For instanc e .  i ns i d ers might cause the f irm to 
e nte r a specific  transact ion.  t h e n  renege o n  the agreement,  and fi ­
n a l l y s e t t le the dispute,  al l  for t h e  scle  p urpose of cre a t i ng better 
o p p o r t u n i ties for t rading.  S i m i l a r l y .  ins i d ers m i g h t  i ncrease the 
vo l a t i l ity of  the stock by inve s t i n :2  in e xcess ive l y  r isky proj ects . 1" 1  
�rh is  k i n d  of · ·· TT1 £Jnage nte nt  � ·  h u i· ts t h e·  p ,·cc.luct ive e fficie ncy of  the 
fi nn . 1-\ n a iysrs . � :�  o u t s i d e rs �  h ::'t \'"t::: n �� � � i n 1 i i �1 r  a b i l i ty  t o  <1 ffc{: t  b usi­
n e ss act i v i t i ;:s .  
Second,  i nsiders w i ! l  attempt t u  !> rutect t h e i r  p r i v i l eged posi tion 
over rirm-speci !ic i n formaTion .  To t h i s  end. they may e m p loy ex­
pen s ive and ove r-burden i n g  m o n i tor ing d evices t o  prevent 
u n de rli ngs from using i nside inform<. H i o n i ' '' This kind of be havior 
harms the p roduct ive e fficiency of the fi rm . A n a lysts,  by contrast,  
c a n n o t  pre ve n t other  a n alysts from h �: n d l i n g  i nform a ti on as they 
see fi t .  
Fi nally,  i ns i ders wi l l  e xploi t t h e i r  pr iv i leged market pos it i on b y  
m anipulat ing t h e  t im i n g o f  disc losure of  firm-specifi c  information 
to  i n crease their  p e rsonal g a i n . 1 111 This,  in t urn, will  h a rm e fficient 
pricing. To i l l ustrate t h is point,  com pare t\VO sce n arios.  Tn the first ,  
'"' See,  e .g  . .  Luci a n  A rye Bebchu k  & Christine Jolls, Managerial  Value D iversion 
and S hareholder \Ve;d t h .  15 J . L. Emn . & Org. 487. 487-SS ( 1 999) ( hncling that  agents 
wili take bus i ness oppmtu n i ties  p rescntc;d to the firm and turn them to t he i r own 
adva n tage ) :  Haft.  supra note JS. at 1 056 ( po i n t i n g  o u t  tlu:t mcmagcrs may " man i pula te 
business decisions 'vi t h  an 1; y t.: to po��;; t ia l  trad i n g  pro fi t s ' " ) .  
1"1 Frank  H.  i:::a s t<.: rhrook .  I nsider Tr�:d ing .  Secre t Age n ts,  Evid e nt ia ry Privi leges, 
and t h e  Produ c t i on of I n fo r m a t ion .  ! 9�\1 S u p .  Ct .  Rev.  309. 332; G i lson & Kraakrnan, 
s upra note 5 3 .  at 6]2 ;� .22 ! (sut ing th; : t .  i f  ;d !nwed to t rilde on n<Jnpubl ie  i n formation , 
managers n1ig h t  n1a ke even n ega t ive n·�l prese n t  Y�l l uc invesLIT1�nts) .  
w :  Currt..: nt l y � top r11 a n agc rs e r!lploy con1 p l i ancc progr( lnls t o  sat isfy t h e i r  fid uc iary 
d u t ies  in :ls:>uring the cumplia nce ul t h e i r  corpurat iun  and empl oyees with legal  
rcst r ic t iuns i n  n1any �1rcas (securit ies  l � l\\·�. �tn t i t ru�t  la \'v' . se xu a l h a rass m e n t ,  a n d  the 
l i k e ) .  Sec.  e.g . . In  r:� Care :1;:: rk  ! n t ' l .  [nc . . D::r ivat ivc L t ig . . 698 A.2d 959, 962-63 ( De ! .  
C h .  I LJ96) .  A l t h o u gh these p rugr:nn:; a r c  t: m p l u v c d  <1n d  t nforccd b y  t h e  corporations,  
t h e i r e ffect iveness stt: m '  fro m the t h reat  o f  cri m i n a l  prusecution as we l l . Under a le£al  
regi n1c ptnn i t t ing i n� i ck� r t t!id ing.  i t  '.v l l l  be: n1uch .nHJrc: costly t o  achieve a si 1n iTa r 
level of com p l i ance fro m e m p l oyees .  
"'3 See, e .g . ,  Ranga Nar<: ya n a n .  ln, i c!er  t rad i ng and t h e  voluntary d isc l osure of 
i n format ion by fi rms. 24 J .  Banking & Fin .  3 9 :\ .  395 (2000) (pos i t i n g  th a t " good news 
is m ore l i kely to be d isclosed c a r l v  than bad news .. ) : Charles M. Ya blon & Jen n i fe r  
H i l l ,  Ti ming Corpo;·ate Disclosur e  w t\laximize Perfo r m a nce-Based Remuneration: 
A Case o f  Misal igned Incent ives?.  3:5 \V::1ke Foresi L. Rev. 83, 86-87 (2000) 
(di�;cussing disclosure m cmipul a t ion  bv m :m age rs tu i ncrease t he i r own 
com pe nsa ti on ) . 
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a p i ece of  nonpubl ic  i nfor m a t i o n  is  d i sc l osed to t h e  p u b l i c .  U n d e r  a 
rule  o f  d isclose or absta i n ,  firms will  opti m ize t h e  t i mi n g  o f  d isclo­
s ur e  t o  protect their  value.  A n a l ysts  ope r a t i ng i n  a compe t i t i ve 
market w i l l  react to t h e  new i n fo r m a t i o n  a s  q uick ly  as possible .  
They will i m me diately price th� i n format ion and trade o n  i t  lest  
� o m eo n e else beat  them to  i t .  
In  the  second sce n a r io ,  a n  i n �·; i c.k: r  h c> l d s  cl p i ,_::r.::c: o r  i ns i d e  i nfor­
m :.nion ,  toge t h e r  w i t h  the pmver to  c!c c i d c  whe t h e r  a n d  w h e n  t o  
d i scl ose or trade on i t .  I f  delay i n g.  d i sc l osure provid e s  t h e  i ns i d e r  
with  b e t t e r  t r a d i n g  opportun i ti e s  <m c.l  i ncre ases  h e r  e xpected p r o f-. h · 1 1  h 1 · 1 '"" c· 1 · r I t s .  s e w 1  postpone t . e  c 1sc  c :; ur�� - o n v c r s c . y ,  I t  pre m a t u re 
disclosure p rovides t h e  i ns i d e r  w i t h  a better oppor t un i t y  to profi t ,  
s h e  w i l l  d isc lose prem aturely ,  even i f  doing s o  h a s  grave conse­
q u e nces for the corpora t i o n . "" Here. too,  the act ions \Vi i i  h a rm n o t  
o n l y  e ffi c i e n t  pricing b u t  a lso t h e  p rod uct ive effi c i e n cy o f  t h e  f ir m .  
·whatever s t rategy i n s i ders e m p l o y  to  i ncrease t h e i r  p rofi ts ,  their  
a b i l i ty to m a n i pulate  t h e  t i m i n g  o f  d i sclosure a n d  t r a d i ng i s  h a rm­
ful .  Either the effi c i ency of the market i s  h i n d e r e d  per se,  o r  
e ff�cie ncy is  promoted b u t  o n l y  a t  the c o s t  of  q u a s i -m o n op o l y  pr ic­
i n g  and h ar m  t o  product ive e ffic i e ncy. I n  th is  case,  t h e  cost  o f  t h e  
m arket  d istort ions caused by i ns i ders i s  born n o t  j us t  b y  t h e  i nves­
tors trading in the stock, but also by all  the econ o mi c  actors w h o  
rely o n  effi c i e n t  a n d  l i q u i d  f in a nc i a l  m arkets. 
In a dd i t i o n  to h a rm i ng e ffi ci e n t  pr ic ing and prod uct ive  e f fi c i e n c y  
i n  order to capture supracom p c t i t i v e  re n t s ,  the i ns i de r s '  excessive 
m arket power has  t h e  u ndes irable effect  o f  d i m i n i sh i n g  l iq u i d i ty i n  
fi n a n cial m arkets .  As expla ined e a r l i e r .  permi t t i n g  i n s i d e r  tra d i n g  
w i l l  cause i n formation traders t o  e x i t  the market  a n d  c on sequently 
reduce t h e  n umber and vo lume of t rades .  This ,  in  turn,  will h a rm 
l i q u i d i ty traders,  as i t  w i l l  raise  t h e  cost and reduce t h e  speed o f  
execut ing transact ions .  
'"' S c e  Ferbe r, supra n o l e  1 3 ,  �It 623: Se l igman .  s u p r a  n u t e  1 3 . a t  1 1 21 .  
'"' K e n n e th E .  Sco t t ,  Ins ider  Trad i ng:  Rule  l Ob-5 . D isclosure , a n d  Corporate 
Privacy, 9 l Legal Stud. 80 1 ,  814-8 1 :5  ( i lJ80 ) ( d i scus,;ing t h <1 l  t radi n g  on i n s i d e  
i n fnrm a t i on may harm t h e  corpor�l t i o n  hv prov i d i ng i n forma t i o n  a t  t i mes when 
accomplishing the business goals rcquircs sccrecv) .  One such example is  SEC v .  Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co. ,  401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir .  1 968 ) .  \\ here i ns iders t r a d e d  over  an extended 
period o f  t ime b e fore publ icly d i sc los ing the d i scovcrv of ure and b e fore the 
corporation acq u i red a l l  t h e  land.  fcl .  a t  0-+3-47. 
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Now the choice becomes cle arer. Permitting insiders to trade o n  
inside information will drive analysts o u t  o f  the m arket, bes towing 
upo n inside rs exclusive control over the provis ion of efficiency and 
liquidity t o  fin anci al m arkets. Restricting i ns ide rs from trading on 
ins ide i r; formation.  coupled with corpor�1 t c: cl isc!os ure dut ies .  w i i l  
aUO '.'.' c l  TTi e_t r k e t  of analysts to dcve i o p .  �/)\ "<'-.. :·.� 1 ! cit� vc i oped �1n d  conl.­
p e t i t ive  iJ n a lys ts �  :n a r ket \:v i i i  provide :�up\: rinr e ffi c i !:: ncy and 
• 1 • • 1 • 1 lfln s up�� rwr t ! l.] U t Cl t ty  at a 1 ower cost .  
Dec:ri te  the  many vices o f  granting i ns id ers the right to trade on 
n o n p u bl i c  i n formation,  it does not necess<> ri l y  mean t h at share­
holde rs v\ i l l  restrict inside r trading if l e ft to t h e i r  own devices. 
Shareholders .  in their capacity as iiquidity t r <:tders , might h ave dif­
feren t  concerns. Liquidity traders do not  l ose on average t o  
insiders and they d o  n o t  care about  aggregate  efficie ncy per se . Li­
quid i ty traders will m ake the same return whether  t h e  m arket h as a 
high level of efficie ncy or a low level of e ffi c iency . As long as 
s hareholders can prevent insiders from dest roying the firm's value 
(that is ,  control t he agency problem),  liqui dity traders do n ot per­
ceive ins iders' control of the pricing of information as a "cost . "  
Liq uidity traders do c are about liquidity ,  hO\vever. Liquidity 
traders and n oise traders provide m arkets w i t h  initial liquidity. 
Trading by insiders provides additio n al liquidity. Although lower 
than the additional liquid ity analysts can provi d e ,  the added liquid­
ity provided by ins iders in combin ation with the initial liquidity 
'''" The a nalysis so far was cond ucted from a market point or view, not from the 
po i n t  of  view ot sh areholders. Our conclusions ho l d true. h owe·.Tr. with even greater 
force \·lhen the share holders' point of view is adoptee\ _  G i ve n  the <H:encv problem 
between m a nage rs and shareholders, gran t ing i n s i d e rs ,; _xcl usive co71troi over t h e  
discl osure and U S <�  of inside i n formation i n  add i t ion to t h e i r  con trol over busi ness 
act ivi t ies is poten t i a l iy harmful for shar e h o l d ers. D i�pcrscd sh are ho ld e rs do n o t  
m o n i t o r  managers, a n d  e n t rust ing managers w i t h  t he ro le  u t  monitoring themselves is 
a s u re rccipe for con tro l fa i l ures. Analysts,  in const rast .  const<l n t ly follow stocks and 
mon i to r  the performance of managers. See, e . g  . . Di rks v _  SEC, 463 U.S.  646, 646 
( 1 983) ( i ll us trat ing a broker dealer who manage J to track clown 21 fraud a l legation ) .  
A s  w e  plan to argue i n  a separate paper, b y  pe rform i n g  t h i s  r o l e ,  analysts m i t i ga te t h e  
a ge n cv problem be tween man agers and shareholders.  a n d  t h us benefit t h e  
shareholders. I ndeed . a recent empirica l st udy has fou n d  that  92 '};, o f  the corporat ions  
s t u d ied enacted po l ic i es restrict ing ins ider  trading,  and 7 8 %  adopted b lackou t periods 
J u r i n g  w h i c h  insider trading is prohibi ted.  The la t te r pni icy resu l ted in  a narrower 
b id-ask spread . See J .C.  B e t tis et aL, Corporate pol ic ies re•;rrict i n g  trading by insiders, 
57 J .  f i n .  Econ. 1 9 1 , 2 1 8  (2000). These corporations arc most i i ke ly  res tri ct ing i nsi de r 
t rad ing because it has a h armful effect on t h e i r  sharchoidcrs and their  com panies .  
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m ay s uffice to prov i de acceptable l iquid i ty  i n  a part icular  stock.  In 
this  case .  l i quidity t raders may prefer  to gran t  i ns i d ers property 
r ights  in  ins i d e  information in e xchange for lower sa lar ies .  
As a na lyzed ahove , the negative e ffects of th is  course of action 
' ' 1 1 > 7  E 
• e  • • • 
d 
• 
arc burn oy the  m a rK e t .  ven ! I  l 1 q u t c! J ty  tra e rs c1 o not care 
about  dfi c i c ncy,  e ffi c i e n t  pric ing i s  i mport a n t  for th e  econ cmy as ;\ 
\vh o !t.: . '  ' '  E ffic ient  pr ic ing  is i m port a n t  for the  market  fo r corpc•rate 
con t ro l .  r·u r m o n i tor ing an d con tro l l i n g  the m a nage m e n t  age n cy 
pro b l e m .  for the a l l ocat ion o f  resou rces i n  T POs a n d  secon d<1 ry of­
fer i n rrs. and for other t ransact i ons i n  the economv that  a re based � -' 
' • ] 1 }'-J  
on m a rKd p nces.  
I I I .  POS ITiVE EXTERNA LITIES O F  THE A NALYSTS' M A RKET 
The i ntroduction of a comprehensive market perspe c t i ve e nables 
us to bring another phenomenon t o  l ight.  A comp e t i t i ve analysts ' 
market  offe rs several types o f  p os i t i ve external i ti e s ,  o f  w h i ch we 
wi l l  focus on two: the i nformat ion market  and the i nvestment  
b a n k i ng i n d ustry.  I n  the fol l o w i ng Sections,  we a n alyze these posi­
tive externalities and show t h at they would b e  lost i f  i n s i d e r  trading 
were permitted,  even s u bject  t o  a contractual regim e .  For t h i s  rea­
son, we conclude that  t h e  prohib i t ion o n  i nsider tradi n g  m ust  be 
ret a i n e d .  
'"' Set.: Nav•.x:n Kh anna e t  a ! . ,  l nsider Trading, O utside Search,  and Re:;ource 
Allocat ion:  Why Firms and Society May D isagree on Insider Tra d i n g  Restrictions.  7 
Rev. Fin .  S t u d .  575.  575 ( 1 994) (showi n g  that  eve n t hough insiders' compe t i t i o n  with 
in form e d o utsi ders red uces the " eq u i l i bri um quality of outsi de i n fo rm a t i o n ,  . . a ! luwing 
insider trad i n g  i n fl icts di fferent "social and private cos ts " : com•.:qc;ent l y ,  
" e n t repren e u rs may prefe r t o  allow i nsid e r  trading even when i t  is n o t  ,;ocial ly 
opt i ma l " ) .  
"'' Fol lowing Uni1ed Slates v .  0 'Hagan ,  5 2 1  U . S .  642 ( 1 99 7 ) ,  some sch o l :us suggested 
that the Su pre me Court's decision has transformed the p ro hibit i o n  on insi d e r  t rad in g 
i n to a nk:re contractual default rule.  S e e ,  e .g . ,  Saikrishna Prakas h ,  O u r  Dysfu nctional  
I nsider Tra d i ng Regi me.  99 Colum. L. Rev. 1 49 1 ,  1 506 ( 1 999). \Ve dis :.1gre e .  A proper 
reading o r () Hagan impl ies  a key d i s t i n ct i o n  be tween inside information in t h,.: clciss!c 
scnse-in forrnat ion originating from the affected firm used by one o f  i ts i n s i d e rs--and 
a d i fferent tvpe of i nside i n fo rmation-in formation generated by outsiders who <tre 
not e m p l oyees of  t h e  affected fi rm. W h i l e  the prohibiti on on t rading i nvolving c l ass ic 
i nside i n forma t i on is cle arly ma n d a tory , and cannot be contracted aro u n d ,  the 
prohibi t ion on t rad i ng invo l ving information generated by outsiders i s  subject to 
cont mcting l ike any other property i nterest .  
"" Sec K a h a n .  supra note 64, a t  1 005-1 7 ( d iscussing a l l  o f  the costs o f  i n e ffi c ient  
mark e ts  a n d  the role of regu l at i on s  i n  curin g these ine fficiencies) .  
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A. The Infomwtion Market 
In the analysts '  marke t ,  some analysts  neve r  disclose their  i n ­
format ion direct l y .  Rather ,  they u s e  t h e i r  i nformational  advant age 
through tradi ng. These an alysts  usual ly work for m aj o r  inst i tu tional  
i nvestors .  O t h e r  analysts ,  h o we ver . disc lose their  fin d i ngs to the 
publ ic .  Of the a n a l ysts  in  th is  group. some disc lose i n form at ion on 
a reg u la r  lxtsi :; as pan o f  the  service  they o ffe r to c l ients ,  whi le  oth ­
ers d isc 1 CJs<; on i y  part of t h e  i n format ion  t h e y  possess as p a rt o f  
promoting a n d  advert i si n g  th e i r  servi ces.  T h e  di sclosure of analyt i ­
cal  inforrnation al lows market  part ici pants t o  j udge,  e x  pos t ,  the 
1 .  - h 1 , , ,, qua 1ty ot Lc <:ma ys t .  · 
The res u l t  is the cre a t i o n  of a n  i nformat ion mark et. Financial 
newspapers, teievisi on channels ,  radio s tations,  web s i tes ,  and 
oth er sources offe r a wide range of fi n a ncial  in formation in a very 
accessible format for free or for a low fee .  It i s  common for ana­
lysts to sh are t he i r  i n format ional  advan tage t hrough i n t e rviews, 
private columns, and commentary on these i n fo rmat ion channels .  
Analysts '  competit ion.  i n  s hort, support s  t h e  development o f  t h e  
information m a r k e t ,  which leads to a d d i t i o n a l  posit ive external­
i t ies .  First ,  the i nformation market improves the e fficiency o f  the 
capi ta l  marke t .  Every a n alyst  who d iscloses h e r  informational  ad­
van t age provides other  a nalysts with  addit ion al i n formation t h a t  
assists them i n  improving their  prici ng.  Second, t h e  i n formation 
m a rk e t  e n h a nces t h e  level  of i nvestment activi t y  in the capital 
market .  As i n format i o n  reaches a l arger segment of t h e  public ,  
m o re people become aware of financial  events and become ac ­
quain ted with fin ancial m arkets.  The level  of understanding of t h e  
investment process is  i ncreased a nd t h e  n e w  k nowle dge h e l p s  b u i l d  
confidence a n d  trust i n  the market . 1 1 1  Consequent ly ,  m o r e  people 
become l iquidity traders (adding the stock market  a s  a n  alternative 
for saving) and stock p ickers (either responding t o  analysts' mar­
k e t i ng efforts and b uying the i r  services ,  or using freely disclosed 
inform ation as a basis for the i r  own i ndependent investme n ts) .  In-
""  Fo:  i nstance , t h e  fi nanci<i l  papers publ ish periodic  comparisons between analvsts' 
recommendat ions and stock prices. 
. · 
'" Cf. Lawrence M. Ausubei ,  I nsider Trad ing in a Rat ional  Expect a t ions Economy. 
80 Am. Econ. Rev. 1 022. l C23 ( 1 990) (argui n g  t h a t  con fid ence i n  the market is 
i m p ortant  and that due to the e ffect or d i m i n ished in vestor confidence, " i nsiders a re 
made better off'" if they can · 'precummit not to l r<tde on their privileged i nformation").  
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creased i nvestment  act ivity increases the demand for a nalysts and 
lowers the cost of capital for firms.  
I nsiders who enj oy excl usivity o v e r  i n s i de informat i o n  t hwart t h e  
development o f  the information market .  Absent  competi t ion,  in­
siders h ave no incent ive to quickly  disc lose i n side i n formation.  
Insiders do not  cate r  t o  c l ie nts :  they g�1 in  only indi rectly from in­
cu�ased inves tment  act iv i tv .  M orr_:: iy>c: r .  i ns iders  c a n no t  s e l l  t h e i r 
i n forrn at i o n a l  a d vantage.  Se vere c u n fl i c Ls of i n tc.rcst and asy1n111et­
r ic  i nformation doom negot i a t i on::; buw,::cn insiders and potential 
buye rs. S imilar ly,  an attempt to s.:: l i  the  i n fo rmation to the public  
( for example,  t o  a te levision c h a n n e l  o r �\ newspaper) will  not  gen­
erate a price equal  to t h e  value of  the  i n form a t i o n  to the ins iders 
because i n formation is a publ ic  gooci . ' 1 '  I n  sum, insiders,  u n li k e  the 
a nalysts'  market, are unable to provide the positive externalit ies 
that  exist  in a well-developed i nforrnatio n  market.  
B. The lnvesmzent Banking industry 
To see the effect of t he analysts'  m arket on the investme n t  bank­
ing industry, assume t hat i nsider trading is permitted.  For the 
reasons explained above, the insiders wil l  drive the a n alysts out of 
the market.  Now suppose that a corporation wishes t o  m a ke an 
I P O .  I nsiders will  find i t  d ifficult to issue shares d irectly to inves­
tors.  Investors will be skeptical of  p urchasing shares s ince i nside rs 
have incentives to man i p u late the corporation's  management i n  
order to i ncrease t h e i r  earnings . 1 1 '  A lso,  t here are n o  a nalysts t o  
monitor corporations a nd their  m a n agem e n t  or  to  disclose i n for­
mation, so i nvestors wili be hesi tant to purchase share s  in a 
corporation they know l i tt l e abou t <:.nd which wil l  n o t  be monitored 
very careful ly . 1 1" Insiders wi i l  have lo e m ploy an  invest m e n t  b ank to 
underwrite the offering i n  order t o  persuade i nvestors t o buy the 
shares. 
The investment bank w i l l  have to em ploy an anaiyst in order to 
pri ce the shares. The ana lys t w i ll study a l l  c u rr e n tly avail able i n ­
formation a b o u t  t he corporat ion,  compet itors, the i n dustry as  a 
1 1 '  See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ukn .  Law and Economics 40-4 1 (2d ed. 1 997) 
(not ing that public goods are both n onexcl ucL!hk a n d  nonrivalrous). 
1 1 '  See supra notes 1 00-01 and accompanying te:' t .  
' 1 ' See supra note 106. 
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who l e ,  and t h e  e c o n o m y  in g e n e ra l . S h e  \Vi l l  set a pr ice for t h e  
shares ,  and t h e y  w i l l  be i s s u e d .  From that  p o i n t  on,  t h e  a na l yst has  
n o  use for the knowle d ge s h e  accumulated regard i ng the corpora­
t i o n .  There i s  no point  i n  fo l l o w i ng t h e  stock because i ns i ders w i l l  
beat  o u t s i d e rs b y  c a p i t a l i z i ng o n  n e w  i ns i d e  i n form a t i o n .  Pr ici n g  by 
i n s i d e rs .  n o n e theless .  can not be t r u s t e d  �� " < l  b a s i s  for 3 secondary 
o ffc r i n �  d u e  to t he c o n fl i ct o f  i n t c re :� t  pr 1  ; l � k m .  Conscquc n t i y. a 
seco n d a ry o l l ·.: r i n g  w i l l  e n t a i l  s im i l ar c o s t s  t o  t h � t t o f  t he i PO .  
F u rt hernwrc:,  w i th o u t  a n alysts,  i n s i d e rs w l l u  o ffe r sh ares o f  their  
corporat ion wil l  a lso h ave to c o n v i nce i n ves tors o f  their  abi l i ty  to 
prcw i d e  l i q u i di t y .  I ns iders  w i l l  be fo rce d  to provide l i q uidity ar­
rangeme nts in  order t o  at tract  i n v e s t ,J r s .  However,  whatever  
arra n ge m e n t  i n s i d e rs adopt  to  p e rs uade i n ves tors to  b u y  shares a t  
t h e  I PO ,  i t  wi l l  ge nerate no p o s i t i v e  spi l l nve rs for o t h e r  corpora­
t io n s  going t h rough a n  IPO. Each corp o r a t i o n  w i l l  h ave to  o ffer i ts  
own l i q u i d i ty assurances.  
Restr ic t i ng ins ider trading,  o n  the other h a n d ,  w i l l  a l low the ana­
l ys t  to  use the k nowledge accum ulated i n  t h e  I P O  process by 
fo l lowing the stock and p r i c i ng i t  o n  a n  o n g o i ng basis .  Effi c i e nt ,  
c o n t i n uous pri c i ng b y  a nalysts i ntrod uces economies o f  scale  and 
scope . F i rs t ,  t h e  i nvest m e n t  m ade d u r i ng t h e  IPO i s  n o t  lost .  A n a­
lysts can update t h e i r  p ri c ing, bearing o n l y  t h e  i nc re m e ntal  cost  of 
t h e  updat e .  Second,  t h e  k n owledge accum u l a t e d  i n  t h e  a n a l ysts '  
m arket  can be reused a n d  d e p loyed i n  t h e  service of  i n vest m e n t  
ban ks w h e n e v e r  a new I P O  s hares s i m i l ar ch a racteris t ics w i t h  a n  
e arl ier  I P O .  The service w i ll b e  o ffe red to  i n vestme n t  b a n k s  o n  
competi t ive terms.  Third ,  i nvestm e n t  b a n k s  w i l l  fi nd t h e  process o f  
a secondary o fferi ng eas ier  a n d  c h e aper w h e n  t h e  shares o f  t he 
corporat i o n  are a l ready traded i n  an  e ff ic i e n t  market  i n  w h i ch 
pr ices  are determined b y  a n a lystS . 1 1 ;  I n de ed . u n d e r  cer ta i n circum­
stances .  e v e n  t h e  SEC r e laxes t h e  r e g_i s t ra t i o n  a n d  t h e  d i sc losure 
r e q u i re m e n ts for secondary offeringsY' '· This is  a clear example of 
"' Sec Merr i t t  B .  Fox. Shelf  Registrat ion.  fntcgra tec! D i,;clos u re .  and Underwri ter 
Due D i l i ge nce :  An Economic A. n alysis,  70 Va.  L. Rev. l005 . 1 008 ( 1 984): Je ffrey N. 
Gordon & Lewis A. Kornha user. E ffici e n t  !v ! a rk<.:ts.  Cos t l v  I n forma t i o n .  a nd 
Securi t ies  Rcsca rch. 60 N.Y. U. L .  R e v .  76 1 .  S I 0 ( 1 98) ) . 
' " Sec fLlX .  supra note 11 5 .  at 1 008 (showing how t i l e  Jll �i rkct  e fficiency rat i onale  
e x p l a i ns " s h e l f' .  regi strat ion u n d e r  Ruk 415 o f  t h e  Se cu ri t ic,; Act o r  1 93 3 ) :  G ordon & 
Kornh�1user. supra n o t e  1 1 5 .  at SJ 0 (ex3 m i n i ng t h e  S EC ' s  u�e of the efficie n t  m a r k e r  
h yp o t h e s i s  i n  l·o r m u l a r i ng i ntegrated d i sclosurc rcq u i r•: m c n h ) .  
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the reduced costs of a secondary offering generated by the exis­
tence of  ongoi ng efficie n t  pricing by analysts .  
F u rt h e rm ore . i n  a wel l -developed anal ysts '  n1arket ,  i n ves tors 
who buy s h a res  i n  a.n I PO will concern the mselves only with the 
bu� i n css  prospects of t he co rporation �me! the qu<di ty  of i ts rn a n ­
c�g.c n·� o.�' n t .  E ffi c i e ncy a nd l i q u id i t y  in  t h e  :�cco n d a ry rn a rket  \'.: i i i  he 
pru v i d= __ >J by t h e  �.t n a l ys ts .  --rhe existe nc�.: t_J f  t h e  a n a l y:) t s ·  rn arkr.:: l c r e ­
C1 t e :=;  ec, 'rw m i e s  o f  scale i n  this  respect a s  we l l .  Once the rn a rkct  i s  
i n  p lace .  i t  can absorb m a n y  n e v·i I POs and sec o n d ary offerings .  By 
gu:na n te e i ng effic ient pric i ng a n d  l iquid i t y ,  the a n a l y s t s '  marke t 
l o \v,· r<.: t he cost  of i s s u i n g  s h <:l n.:s fo r a l l  corporat i o n s ,  sparing e a c h  
i n d iv idua l  corporat ion the i l e e d  to provide e ffic iency and l i qui dity 
o n  i ts  mvn .  
A w<::l l -developcd investment b an k i ng industry, i n  t u rn .  a t tracts 
fi rms from countries with iess deve l oped markets to i ssue s h ares 
and l i st them i n  the more d eveloped market.  The d e ve loped ana­
lvsts '  m arket and investment i ndustry in t h e  Un i te d States at tract 
fi rms from a l l  ove r t he world . 1 17 This process carries with  i t  m a ny 
be n e fi ts :  I t  i ncre ases t h e  act ivi t y  a n d  profits of the i n ve s tm e n t  
banking i ndustry a n d  its per ipheral  m ar kets ,  i t  provides  A me rican 
i n vestors with  a wi der range o f  inves tment opportun i ties ,  a n d  it in­
creases the demand for t he services of an alysts .  None of  these 
pos i t i ve external i t ies  can be realized without an ana lysts ' m a rket .  
I V .  T H E  CASE F O R  N EG ATlYE PROPERTY RIG HTS T N  1>1S f D F. 
[ NFORNl AT l ON 
Given the  i m portant pos i t ive external i t ies  gene rated by a n a lysts ' 
compe t i t i o n ,  a n d  given that  n one of them would arise i f  i ns i ders 
w e r e  perm. i t ted to  appropriate  and exploit  i ns ide i n form a t i o n .  we 
s ubrn i t  t h a t  effic iency dictates  that insi ders be ban ned from trading 
o n  ins ide i n formation . Com bining t h i s  conclusion wi th the prope rty 
,.  \Vh i k  non-U .S .  companies ra i sed only $7 b i l lion i n  the A me rican nur k c t  and "of 
the  -+20 n o n -don1 e st i c  co1npanies regist ered \Vi t h  the fJ.S .  SEC:, n1 ost \Vt� r�� C a n ;:�J i a n "  
i n  l lJ8lJ. " i n  1 9')8 n o n - U . S .  i ss u e rs o ffered m o r e  t h a n  ::5200 bi l l i o n  i n  t h e  U n i ted 
States . . .  Lind �1 C. Quinn, fnternat i onal Regulation o f  Cross - B o rckr O i'fe r i n gs and 
Listi ngs of Securities- A W indow of Opport uni ty, Tntcrn ational Securities M a rkets  2 
( J 999 ) .  I n  1 999. · ·n1orc than 1 . 1 00 non- U . S .  c o rn p a n ies  frorn Sf, countr i �: s  [ \vcrcl 
regi:;tcrcd w i t h  the S E C. ' '  J J .  
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r iohts  e n t i t le m ents framework , "" we posit , for the fi rst t i m e ,  th a t  � 
t h e  c h a l lenge of i n s i d e r  trad i ng presents a com pel l ing case for as-
sign i n g  a " negat i ve property r igh t "  t o  i ns iders wit h  respect to  
i ns ide  i n fo r m a t i o n .  The e ffect of  a neg a t i ve property r i g h t  i s  to 
de n y  the grantee t h e  power to appropr i ate a soci a l l y  va l uable  re­
:-;o u rc ,::-i n o ur  cctse . i n form a t i o n ---i n o rd e r t o  a l l o w  a m o re 
e ff i t: i c: n t  r(: g i rn c  to cL .. : vc l o p . I n  t h e  p :·csc n t  c o n t e :� t .  t h �  ban  n n  i n ­
s i de r t r:;c! i n g  acco m p l i s h e s  j ust  t h a t .  \N i t h o u t  t h e  han . i n s ide rs.  
because o f  their prox im i ty  to the ti rrn,  would be able to appropri­
a te and e x p l o i t  nonpublic  i nform a t i on .  T h i s  a b i l i ty would adversely 
i rnp�tct  the  i n form a t i o n  m a rket  a nc! the  ;;'con omy on the w h o l e .  The 
ban on i n s i d e r  t rading-or,  as we sec i t ,  t h e  assign m e n t  of <1 nega­
t ive prope rty r ig ht t o  i ns i d ers-is necessary to eschew the 
suhopt irn a l  reg i m e  that would othe rwise deve l o p .  As a result  o f  t h e  
ba n .  m ore e ffici e n t  i n formation markets  a n d  fin ancial m arkets  c a n  
evo lve . 
There r e m a i n s  t he ques t i on of why the property r ight  s h o u l d  not 
be assi gned pos i t ive l y  t o  a speci fi c  an alyst .  Ex ante,  i t  i s  im poss i ble 
to determ i n e  w h ich a n a lyst vai ues the i n formation at  i ssue most  
h i gh ly .  Allowing a n a l ysts  t o  compete over n o n p ublic i n format ion 
i s ,  t h e refore . t h e  only  v iable  way to e nsure t h a t ,  o n  average,  the  
a nalyst who places the highest  va l u e  o n  i nform a t i o n  wil l  obtain i t  
first .  B ecause a n al ysts operate in a compe titive env i r o n m e n t  t o  
maxi m ize th e re tur n o n  i nves t me n t  i n  i nformation ,  t he a n a l yst  w h o  
fi rst  o b t a i n s  nonpubl i c  i n form a t i o n  wi l l  h ave to process the  i nfor­
m a tion to the market as q u i c k l y  as poss i b l e ,  lest she be beaten by 
ot h e r  a nalysts \Nho seck the same i nforma t ion.  Th e o p t i m a l  prop­
erty regime wi th respect to i n format ion-the quintesse nt ia l  pub l i c  
good---is o n e  o f  free competi t ion -' ' � T o  e ffect t h i s  regim e ,  h owever, 
i t  i s  necessary to ass i gn a n egat i ve property right to ins iders t o  ex­
clude t he m  from the group of legi t imate appropria tors .  As we 
1 1 '  'fhe c h a l le n ge of ins i der u-ad i n g  i '  w i ck l y  re rceivcJ :::;; one of effic ient  a ! l oc:J t i o n  
of p ropc n v  righ ts  i ;1 nonpu b l i c  i n for:;1a t ion .  S e c  genc:ra l l v  G u i d o  C i l a hrc:si & A .  
Dou� i ;:s Mc: i :l mecl .  Pronertv R u les,  Liabi l i t y  R u les. and l n a l icnabi l i tv :  O !·J c  View uf 
the  (:;: t h c: J r: J ! . 85 Harv: L -Rev. 1 089, l ll15.:.. 1 5  ( 1 97 2 )  (dividing protec t ion  mode:; o f  
i e g a !  1; n t i t k m c n ts i n t o  property rules .  l i a b i l i t y  rules.  and inalienabil i ty rules ) .  
1 1 "  For d i 5cussi ''" of  t h e  di ffere nt :;spcct:> of idorm ation as a public goc•cl and a 
coi lcc t i vc good. sec K i m b e r l v  D. Krawiec. Fairnc�;s.  E fficiency.  a n cl Ins ider Tra d i m: :  
Dc:collst ru�t i ng  t h e  Coin o f  t l� e  EZe alm i n  t h 1: i n format ion Age," 95 Nw. U .  L.  Rev .  4-+3' . 
4:+f .AS ( 200 l ) . 
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showed,  the  use of a nega t i ve prope rty r ight  i n  the i n i t i a l s tage t o  
neutra l ize the i ns i d e r s ·  i n h e re n t  advant age n o t  on ly improves t h e  
e fficie ncy a n d  l i q u i d i t y  o f  fi nancia l  m arkets b u t  a lso g e n e r a tes 
various pos i t ive  e x te rn a l i t i e s  t h a t  o t he rwise would not h a ve co m e 
to exis t .  
\/ . [ �\ ' !  ��:; I C '< S  O F  T i  i E  AN.-\ LYS I S  
l n  addi t i o n  t o  provi d i n g  ; i  n ·.:.: w  e ffi c i ency j u s t i fica t i o n  fo r t h e· b c t n  
on i ns i d e r  trad i n g .  o ur  Zl n J. I ys i s  sh eds n e w  l igh t o n  t wo u nresolve�d 
l egal problerm: selecti\ c d isc losur e  <! n d  warehousing.  O u r  a n a lys is  
a l lows us to i l l u m i n a t e the  contl i c t ing goals a nd t h e  tens ions  i n ­
v o l ved i n  these i ss ues .  as wel l  as t h e  parameters r e l e va n t  t o  t h e  
p o l i c y  dec is ion t h a t  attempts  to  resolve t hese tensions.  
A. Selective Disclosure 
For a variety o f  reasons ,  many corporations d o  not  a t tract  a n a ­
l ysts '  coverage. '=" A n a lysts m a y  overlook corpora t io n s  beca use of 
t h ei r  s ize ,  country of ori g i n ,  or i ndustry affi l iat ion.  In  a l l  o f  t hese 
cases,  the cost of gat he ring a n d  p rocessing private i nfor m a t i o n  t o  
t h e  market d oes n o t  guarantee a n y  i n d i v i du a l  a n a l ys t  a s uffi c ie n t  
r e t u r n  t o  j ustify the coverage.  The v a l ue o f  the information i s  d i s ­
persed i n  the m arket a n d  l ost  w i t h o u t  any ben e fi t  t o  t h e  
s h ar e h o l de rs .  
When insiders are restr i cted fro m  tradi ng,  they m a y  s e l e c t i ve l y  
d isclose n e w  i nfor m a t i on t o  a n a l ysts i n  order to i ncrease t h e  re­
turns to  the  s h arehoiders.  and, i n d i rect ly ,  to themselves . 1 2 ' 1n t h i s  
w a y ,  t h e  p r o h i bitio n on i n si d e r  t ra ding fost e rs t h e  p ract ice of selec­
t i ve disclosur e .  N atural ly.  the  a n a l ysts \vho receive the i n fo r m at ion 
enj oy a t i m i n g  adv a n t age over t h e  market ,  w h i ch g u a r a n t e es t he m  
"" Companies that  ra i l  t u  a t t r<1Ct a nalys t  cove rage arc col l o q u i al ly ca l led - -m�t rket  
o rp h a ns . ' ·  Sec S a n ro rd R .  Kavn< lr  Jr .  & Michael  Pe rei ra .  Orphan S t o ry , The D :t i l y  
Deal (N. Y . ) .  !\ ug. 2 9 .  200 ! .  a t  2 2 .  
'" I n  l ight  o r  t h e  - - p c r, o n a l  b e n e ri t  
.
. t e s t  s e t  for t h  in  Dirks v .  SEC 463 u .S .  646 
( 1 983 ) ,  the  common v i e w  was t h il t  sckct i vc d isclosure to analysts d ocs n o t  v i ( ) l a t c  
i n s i d e r  t r a d i n g  r e s t r i c t i o n s .  as i<lng as t h e  i ns i d e rs are n o t  a t t e m p t i n g  to g a i n  pc rson < l i  
benefi t  fro m  the d isc losure .  Sec .  e.g . .  Paul  P .  B r o u n tas Jr . .  Nutc .  Rule lOb-5 and 
Vol un t ary Corporate D isclosures to Secur i t ies  A n a iysts.  92  C o l u m .  L Rev.  1 5 1 7 . 1 529 
( 1 992) ( "'The Dirks decis ion h;ls been widely const rued as a l lowing consiclc:rablc 
la t i tude i n  coq.1oratc:  d i o;c lpsurcs to  analyst s . ' " ) .  
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higher returns on t h e i r  investm e n t  in inform a t i o n .  In exchange, 
these a n alysts  engage in continuous monitoring and coverage of 
the relevant firm and pro v id e  t h e  firm \Vi th  bet ter  l i quidi ty  and 
prici ng for its shares.  In addit ion,  t h e  an a l ys ts provide t h e  firm with 
better m o n itori ng o f  the rn a n a gc m c n t  Rnd a vaiuable external 
C\'a l uat ion of its proposed b us i ness  s t r a tegy . ' 22 Fi n a l l y ,  se lective dis­
c losure a l lows m a n age1n e n t  t o  (i i :; <.:l use to  a n alysts  pieces of 
se n s i t i ve i n forn1ation that C(t n n o t  he d i �_� \J us� .. �d  in t h e i r  Dure forn1 to 
the w ho l e  m arket. 1 23 S uch d i sclosure i m proves e ffi c ien t pricing and 
reduces a n alysts '  need t o  expend r c s c urces on se arc h ing for firm­
spe ci fic i n formation.  
From a property rights  perspectiv e .  the practice of selective dis­
closure temporarily p uts the r ights  t o  inside i n formation i n  the 
hands o f  a small  group of ana lysts rather than immediately granting 
the rights to  the m arke t as a whol e .  In th is  l ight,  s el ective disclo­
sure s ubsti tutes " i mmediate- a l i - an alysts ' -compe t i t i on" vvi t h  a 
' · temporary-selected-analysts ' -exc l usivi t y . "  Admi ttedly,  the tempo­
rary exclusivity granted to t h e  selected ana lysts generates t h e  same 
i l l  e ffects associated with  i nsider trading,  i n  part icular,  reduced l i­
quidity a n d  harm to a nalysts outside o f  the selected group. Yet, for 
smal l companies whose s h a res are traded w i t h  l o w  l iquidity, i t  is a 
necessary step o n  the way to competit ive analyst  coverage. I n  this 
sense,  t h e  exclusivity generated by s e lective disclosure is  analogous 
to t hat created by p a t e n t  or copyright protection .  I n  al l  cases,  t h e  
l o s s  associated with the gra nt o f  temporary exclus ivi ty  is presuma­
bly outweighed by the e ns uing long-term benefits.  The practice of 
selective disclosure is also a d va ntageous to shareholders because i t  
e nables them to subs t i tute  t h e  potential  gains from i nsider trading 
i n  the form of lower s a l aries for i mproved anal ysts'  coverage and 
superior l i quidity and pricing. 
Seemingly, analysts outside of the selecte d  group would i ose 
when trading against  the sckcted group, and t h u s ,  would avoid 
trading in that stock. The S EC's newly enacted ban o n  se lect ive 
'" See Daniel  R. Fische l ,  I n s i d e r  Trading a n d  l n ve� tmcnt  A n a l ysts: An Economic 
An alysis of Dirks v. Securirics and f:'xclumgc Cununission. 1 3  H o fstra L. Rev. 127.  142 
( 1 984) (arg u ing that analysts who rece i ve non publ ic  i n formation from i nsiders ' 'have 
i n centives t o  engage i n  some search t h e mselves be fore making reco m me n d a t ions to 
their  c l ients."  t h u s  performi n g  a m o n i t o r i n g  !'unct i o n ) .  
"' lei .  a t  1 4 1-42. 
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disc losure mandates equal t i m i n g  of  d i sclosure,  and thus,  protec ts 
t h e  analysts  who are n o t  part  of the s e l ected group . ' ' '  Is t h e  n ew 
rule desirable? This  rule i m proves comp e t i t ion a m o ng anal ysts ,  
a n d  thus ,  i t s  e ffect on l arge compa nies  with wide cove rage b y a n a ­
l ys ts  and h i gh l iq u idi ty i s  c lear ly  des irab l e .  I n d e e d .  w i th r e s p e c t  t o  
such comp a n i es t he n e w  rule i s  cons iste n t  with o u r  a n ,l iysis .  
The prob lem i �; the e ffe c t  u t" t h e  n e w  rule on s rn a l i  c o m p : t n i l>;  
\V i t h  ! O\V l i qu id i ty ,  con1 pan i 1.2S  t hat  t·:.i i l  t u  a t � r �lC�  a n a l y s t s �  coveret_sc .  
The equ a l i ty o f  t i m i n g  m a n d a te d  hy the  S E C  promotes  po t e n t i a l 
J cc c s s  to al l  a n alysts but  sacrifi ces acw�t l  access by a fe w sekcteJ 
a n a l ysts .  I t  m ust be b o rn e  i n  m ine! , h owever,  t h at t h e  o u t-of- the­
i n n e r-circle a n a lys ts w h o m  t h e  n e w  ru le  p rot ects decl i n ed t o  cover 
t h e  stock in the first p l ace.  Th us. u nder the new e q u a l  t i m i ng r u l e .  
ful l-scale competi t ion wou ld n o t  l eave a s u fficie n t  retu rn o n  i n­
ves t me n t  in i nformation for a n y  i n d i vidual  a n a l ys t . 
Moreove r ,  i n s tead of t h e  t h eoret ical e q ua l i ty t h a t  the SEC is a t ­
temp ting to promote,  t h e  pract ice of se lect ive disclosure p reserved 
pract ical  eq uality with respect to the r ight  to become a n  a c t u a l  ana­
lyst o f  the stock since al l  analysts  could compete over  o ffe r i n g  t h e i r  
services t o  i ns id e rs .  Ins ide rs wi l l  p r e fe r  to l i m i t  t h e  t imi n g  a dvan­
tage and i ncrease t h e  i nn e r  circle in order to l im i t  t h e  abi li t y  of t h e  
s e lected grou p  t o  expl o i t  i t s  exclus ivi ty  a n d  i mprove t h e  analysts '  
cover age . Indeed,  ins iders '  attempts to l i m i t  the p o w e r  of  t h e  se­
lected group can be i n fe rred from t h e  gradual  i ncrease i n  the 
number of corporations using " open conference cal l s , · '  eve n b e fore 
the p roposed regulat ion that  m a n d a tes e q u a l  t i m i ng. 1' '  Opening a 
"' Sec S E C  R u les l OO ( a ) .  l OO ( a ) (  I ) . a mi 1 0U ( a ) ( 2 ) .  Regu l a t io n  F D .  ! 7 C . F . R .  � 243 
( 200 ! ) . For a view �u pporting the equa l t i m i ng p ri ncip l e . sec Se l igm a n . supra note 13. 
"' The S E C  p u b l ished t h e  p ropose d FDR in E x c h a n ge Act R c: l c �1se No. 42259,  Feel. 
Reg. Proposed R u l e V o l .  64 pg. 72590 (2UOU) .  I"I'Jirinred in [Tra n s l'er B i nder  ! 999-
2000] 1 9 17 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ( CCH) 'll B2.846 ( De c. 20. 1 999). A 1 998 survcv 
cond ucted by the N at ional I n ves t o r Relat i ons I n s t i t ute (" ' N l R I  . . ) o f  i ts m c m bc:r 
compan ies found t ha t 83 % of t h e  cc, m p a n i es conduct con t e rence c a l l s  for a n alysts ( u p  
from 7 3 '}0 i n  1996): 27 % of t h e  companies a l low i n d i ,· icl ual i n vestors t o  part icipate 
a n d  1 4 °/c, i nvi te:: t he med ia iO pilrl ic ipate :  8 9 '/'u of t h e  compa n i e s  ( u p  from o6 °;(, in 
1 996 ) tape the i r  con fe rence calls for l a te r p l a yback 1 · ia  t o l l - fi-cc n u m b e r  (59 % )  o r  t o i l  
n u mber (34 % ) .  Na t ion a l I nvestor Relat ions I n s t i t ut e .  N I R J  R e l e ases Follow-up 
S u rvey on the Growing Use o f  Co m m u n i c a t i o n s  Te c h nologv i n  t h e  Pract ice  of  
I n vestor Re l a t i ons . a t  h t t p://www.n i r i . org/publ icat ions/;l l c: rt ,/ea05 1 898. cfm ( May 1 8. 
1 998).  Anothe r 5urvey con d uct ed by N I R T  in J u n e  ! 999 fo u n d  th a t 84% o f  the N I R I  
corporate  m e m be rs s u rveyed cond uct c o n ference c1 l i s  wi t h  a n <t iysrs: 55 '/i, o r  t hose 
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con fe re n ce ca l l  t o  a l l  i n tere s t e d  i n vestors i ncreases d r a m a t ica l ly  th e 
membe rs of the · · se lected grou p" a n d  t h us e rode s  almost  com­
plete l y  the  exclw; i vity probl e m . "6 In d eed , the proposed regu l a t i on 
tre a t s  a n  o p e n  confere nce cal l as a m e t hod s a t i sfyi n g  t h e  e q u a l  t i m ­
i n g  re q uireme n t . ' : ' 
O f  c o ur c; c .  e v e n  i n  smal l and i l l iqu id  com p a n i e s .  s e l ec t ive d i sc l o­
s u rt�' 1...\ l n  h'-.: < 1 b u sc d  b '.J i ns i de rs i n  v i c� Li t i o n  o f  the c r i n1 i na l  
res t i · i�t i u n  u n  i i 1s i d c r  lr�uJ i n g  a n d  i n  breach o f  t h c i :· fi d t!c i c 1 ry du­
t i t: s . : > C\ i l l S 'r:> i ri n �  w i t h  · ' fake a n a l ys ts . . .  t iou in!::: t h e  "paL\ce Q u a rds . . . '-' -' 1 I \_.' > '-"" • 
rc:w Muing <t n a l ysts fo r favorable reco m m e ndat ions ,  ; :m d  reward i n g  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n vestors for pass iv i ty ("vote b u y i n g ' ' )  a r c  j ust  a few 
e.\Zi mpks. 'c" G iv e n  t h at se l ective disclosure can e i t h e r  pro m o t e  o r  
d i m i nish e ffi c iency.  t h e  q ues t i on becomes:  Is i t  d e s i r a b l e  to b a n  se­
lect i ve d i scl osure across t he  board a s  t h e  S E C ' s  mle mandates .  or 
wouic! i t  be pre fe rable t o  exempt small  and i l l i q u i d  compani e s  a n d  
l e t  m a r k e t  forces regulate t h e m ?  
A complete b a n  w i l l  minim ize the occ urrence of a busive selec­
t ive disclosur e  w h i l e  s i mu ltaneously destroying t h e  be n e fi ts t h a t  
c o u l d  be accrued to s m a l l  and i l l iquid companies from e ffi c i e n t  se­
lect ive d isclosure.  S u c h  a result  could be j ust i fi e d  if one be l i eves 
t h at abusive select ive d isclosure considerably d o m i nates  effi cien t 
companies ( up from 2 9 %  i n  1 998) a l low i n d i vi d ua l invr�stors to participate a n d  42 'Yo 
i n v i t e  t h e  m ed i a to  l i s t:::n ( u p  from 1 4 %  i n  1 998). )\la t i on a l  I n vestor R e l a t i on s  
Inst i t ut e .  Newlv Ct>mplctcd S u rvey Confirms G reater Ope n ness i n  Confcr:::nce Ca l l s 
a n d  Acce lerat ing Use uf Technology . a t  h t t p ://www. n i r i .org/p ubl ic ; : t ions/ale ns/ 
e:!Ob l 09lJ .cfm (June 1 8. 1 9'! 9 ) .  A su rvey conducted in February 2000, :t ftc r  t h e  S EC' 
proposed FO R was p u b l i s h e d .  fo u n d  t h a t  83 % o f  the com pan i es c o n d uct confere nce 
c a l ls lor an a lysts . N a t i o n a l  I nvestor Re l a t i o ns I ns t i t u t e .  Most Corporate Con fe re nce 
Calls  ,-\ rc N u w  Open Ill I n d i v i d u a l  in vestors · a n d  t h e  Media,  at h tt p ://www.n i ri .org/ 
p u h i i ca t i ons/a l c rto;/ea022900.cfm ( fc h .  29. 2000). Of t h ose compa n ies.  82 'X, ( u p  from 
5 :5 %  in ! 9lJlJ ) a l l ow i nd i v i d u a l  i n vestor·s to p a rt icipate a nd 74 'Yo i n v i t e  th ·� m e d i a  ( u p  
f w m  -+2% i n  1 9Y9) . ! d .  
" "  J d ,: a l l v .  i n s id e rs would u s e  such a stra te�v o n l y  w h e n  t h e re is  no n e e d  t o  provide a 
sckcred gmu p  or a na lvs ts wi t h  s upracon;pc t i t i�·c rents. Reachi n g  t h i s st:1gc is a 
gr;�du;� !  prnccs,;. i n i t i a l ! v .  t h e  stock is neglect ed and select ive d i sclosu re is needed t o  
a t t ract coverage. As pri ci ng a n d  l iq u i d i t y  are gradually i mprovi n g . cl ue t o  the  'e l ec ted 
group CO\'Cragr: .  more an a lyst s  a n d  o 1 h c r  i n form �H i on t raders :n1cl l i q u i cl i t y  t raders  arc 
a t t ra c t e d  t o  the stock.  re ach i ng the po in t when t h e re i s  nu need fo r se lec t i ve 
d i,clos u rc � n v murc . The S E C  rule  w i l l  prevent  t h i s process. 
1 27  Sec The S E C's D i scuss i on of P,egu lat ion FD, 1 7  CFR �S  240, 243. 249 (2000) .  
"' See L111gcvuort .  s u p r a  n o te :5 ,  a t  1 040-44. 
: : , Sec J n h n  C. C\J ftec J r  .. Is Select ive Disclosure Now Lawfu l ? .  1 997 l'·i . Y .  L.L J ul y  
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select ive d i sclosure .  Judging from t h e  dramatic increase in the use 
of open conference cal l s ,  it seems clear t h a t  for small compan ies , 
se lect ive d isclo s ure is m e r e l y  an i n te r i m  stage on t h e  w a y  to ach ie v­
i n g  compe ti ti ve a n alyt ical  coverage . 
-;-\ ! tow ing the market t o  regu l a t e  s e l e c tive  d isclo sure by s m a l l  
a n d  i l l i q u id com pm: it::s  wi l l  create  a sy::.t ,� m t h a t  preserves efficient  
s c k c L i \'C cl i sclc:': ure w h i l e  d i ::;co1  . .  i i'� l � i n g  : rbus i ve s e l e c t ive  cl isclc­
' ' . .. . . , I .' • •  .,.,l. 1!' c· '1 h r' ! ;  I \ . r )  f t I' p "' ' 1  rk �' t t , ,  ,. , , ,, Lt 1 . '  ' • '  ,· e ] "' C l  i V"' a·! l' s c 1  osu ,. ,, ,_, -._i \ ,_.. , 1 C� I I ) ·._ • L l '-' .l l  • <.� < .._ l � '-" l .._. 0 I Lt l ..., J '-' L- - ! J. ...._. 
efl"i c i c n t l y  rests o n  ir :; a bi li ty  to e fficien t l y  e n force fid uc i ary d u ti es 
a n cl i ns ider  tradi ng restr ict i o n s .  G i -v·cn t h �t t  e n forcement is  t h e  key 
i ssue , the pot en t i al for a buse o f  s e l ec t i ve disclosure i s  n o  d i fferen t  
t h a n  t h a t  o f  a n y  o t her  fi duciary duty o r  i l lega l i ns ider tra d i n g .  For 
i nstance , i n s i ders can buy i ns t i t u t i o n a l  i nves tors ' passivity through 
many o th e r  preferen t ia l deals 1 "-for example ,  private placement  of 
prefe rred s h a res-wi t h o u t  resorti n g  to se l e ct ive disclosure. To be 
sure , in the case o f  selective discl osure , it  i s  diffi cult  t o  prove a 
breach of fi d uci ary d ut i es due to the i n herent  presen c e  of mixed 
m o tives. Yet ,  no com p le te b a n  i s  i mposed o n  such transact ions .  In­
deed,  a longside th e legal  sanct ions ,  other non-legal  market 
mechanisms,  s uch as the m arket  for corporate contro l ,  the m arket  
for managers , and rep ut a tio n , work t o  reduce such m anifestations 
of the agency probl e m . 1 ·'' 
'"' There is s t i l l  a r isk t h a t  srn�t l l  f irms w i l l  be abusive.  We c o n t e n d  t h a t  selective 
d i sclosure ge n e ra l es import a n t  be n e fi t s  fo r s m a l i  b u s i nesses-b e n e fi t s  t h a t  outweig h .  
i n  o u r  opinion , the t h r e a t  of abuse . Moreover. t hese benefits just ify relying on the 
m a r k e t  to control  the p o t e n t i a l  fo r abusive c o n d u c t .  
'31 S e e ,  e .g . .  Edward B .  Rock.  Con t rol l i ng t h e  D a r k  S i d e  o f  R e l a t i o n a l  I nvest ing,  1 5  
Cardozo L .  Rev. 987. 989 ( ! 994) ( d iscussi n g  s i tuat ions where ' ·an investor acqui res a 
l arge (for examp l e .  9.5 % )  i n t e re s t i n  t h e  firm a t  a discu u n t  i n  exchange for p rotect ing 
i n cu m b e n t  m a nagers fro m d isplace m e n t  or.  more ge n e r a l ly.  from threats  to t he i r  
a u tonomy ' ' ) .  
"' Sec ge n e r a l l y  Fra n k  H.  Easterbrook & D a n i e l  Fisc he l .  The P r o p e r  R o l e  o f  a 
Targe t ' s  M an a gem e n t  i n  Respon d i ng to a Te n d e r  O ffe r. ':!4 H a rv. L. Rev. 1 1 6 1  ( 1 98 1 )  
( e x p l a i n ing t h e  role o f  t h e  market  for co rpo ra te control) ;  Henry G .  Manne, Mergers 
an cl t h e  Market  for Co rpo rat e Contro l .  73 J .  Po l .  Eco n .  l l O  (1965) (sam e ) ;  Euge n e  F. 
F a m 8 ,  Agency Pro b lc:: ms a n d  the Thcorv of t h e  Firm.  88 J. Pol .  E c o n .  288 ( 1 980) 
(exp l a i n i n g  t h e  role of t h e  market  for m a n agers ) :  E clw8rd B. Rock, S a i n ts and 
S i n n e rs:  How Docs Ddawarc Corporate Law Work'l . .\4 U CLA L. Rev. 1 009 ( 1 997) 
(expl a i n i n g  the role of r e p u t at i o n ) :  Zoh a r  G o s h e n .  Vot ing and t h e  Economics of 
Corporate Sclf- D e <J l i n g: Theory Meets R e a l i t y .  at h t tp://papers .ssrn .com/sol3/ 
papers. c fm ') abstract_icl .=229263 ( J u l y  20. 2000) ( u n publ ished m a n uscript) .  
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Simi lar ly ,  regardless  o f  t h e  possi bi l i t y  f o r  s e l e c t i v e  d isclosure,  i n ­
s iders c a n  circ umve nt t h e  p ro h i b i t i o n  on i ns ider  t ra d i n g  b y  us ing 
n o n- i n s i de r  col l aborators .  This  s t ra tegy i s  d i ffic u l t  to detect .  The 
response i s  that  as long <.l S t h e  lega l  s a n ct ions  c re a te a sufficie n t  d e ­
t e rr e n t  to  control  a n d  l i m i t  t h e  n um hc r o f  v i o l a t i o n s ,  an a n a l y s t s ·  
ll1 ct r l\. r2 t  can fu n c t i o n .  En !o rce m c n t  d \i ·, · ·; n o t  h ave t o  b e  perfect ;  i t 
j us t  h as to  be s u ffi c i e n t l y  c: lfec t i ve: l •  �t !-i"c· rd  a n <l l ys t s  a s u ffi ci e n t  
pro fi t  m a rgi n .  j ud g i n g  fro m  t h e  fl u u r i :; h i n �  C i l l < l i y� t s · market  i n  t h e  
U n i te d  States ,  the e n force m e n t  syskm c u rren tly m e e t s  t h is s tan­
dard.  
B. \Vard;ousing 
Warehousing is a p r a c t ice  t h a t  e n a b k�s bidders to ga i n  c o ntrol o f  
a targe t corporatio n  by e nlist i ng t h e  h·� l p  of  a group of  rel a ted i n ­
vestors. 133 T h e  bidder  d i s c l oses h e r  in t e n t i on t o  a s e l e ct e d  group o f  
rel a t e d  i n vestors w h o  b u y  t h e  share s  o f  t he t a rge t corpora t i o n . \.;" 
W h e n  t h e  tender  o ffer is a n nounce d ,  t h e  group t e nders t h e  s hares 
to  the bidder for the p remium offcrecL 1'o This group ' '\varehouses" 
t h e  s hares for  the bidder  in  exch a n ge for  t h e  takeover p r e m i u m . 136 
Warehousing i ncreases the  proba b i l i ty of a s uccessful t ak eover 
by avoidi n g  holdouts  a n d  shorte n i n g  the t i me n ee d e d  for s h are­
h o l ders'  response . 137 W h e t h e r  this  k ind of s trat e gy i n creases 
13·' See Roge r J .  Dennis .  Th is Li t t l e  P iggy W r.: t l t  t o  iVLnkc:: t :  The Regui <1 t i o n  of Risk 
A rbitrage aft e r  Boeskv, 52 Alb. L.  Rev.  S4 l . 1)7'J n . :204 ( l 9SS).  
'" See S te phan ie F. B ar k h ()iz.  Cnm rne n t .  i n� i d e t· Tradi n g .  t he C o n t e m po ra neous 
Trad e r. and the Corporate Aeq u i r·� r :  E n r i t l e m c n t  to Profi ts D isgorged by the S EC .  40 
Emory L.J. 537, 56 1  ( 1 99 1  ) . 
''' Joel Seligma n ,  The R e fo r m u l a t ion uf Fed e nd Secu r i t ies  Law Concerning 
Non p u b l i c  I n format ion . 73 G c o .  L . J .  1 ( )33 ,  I 1:14 ( i 1.JS5 J .  
1 '' ! d. il l 1 1 34 ("To the b i d d e r .  ·warr.: h u u s i n g ·  mav · Iuck up· t h e  ta rgc t ·s s hares i n  
fri c n cl lv hands:  to t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n .  ll' c l rehousing u l"fcrs t h e  opport u n i ty for a swi ft 
pre m i u m  when the s hares arc resold in the t e n d e r  oi le r . " ) .  Given the consen t of t h e  
bidder  to t h e  purchase. t h e re is no breach nf f iduc i �l r\' c.l utv t owa rd s  t h e  source o f  t h e  
i n formati o n .  Conse q ue n t l y ,  there i s  nu fra u d .  a n d  n o  v i o la t ion o f  R u l e  l Ob-5 o f  t h e  
S EC. Howe v e r ,  t h e  S E C  restr icts  t h i s  p r cic t i cc t h m ugh R u l e  1 4e-3(a)  o f  t h e  S EC. 
requir ing n o  breac h o f  fi d uci a ry cl u t \' .  Si nce fraud i s  n o t  req uired.  t h e  va l id i ty ol Rul e 
1 -le-3 was ch a l l e nged . The S U ]lreme Court d i d  not  respond to t h e  chal lenge. United 
States v .  o · Hagan . 521 U . S .  642 .  672 tL I 7  ( 1 99 7 )  ( ' · We leave for a n o t h e r  clay.  when 
the issue req uires  decisi on . the l cgi t i m ac\· o f  Rule l 4e-3(a)  as app l i e d  to 
· warehousing'  . . . .  " ) . 
' '' Set: Macey. supra n o t e  6. a t  1 8- i 'J :  S e l i g m a n .  supra note 1 35 .  a t  1 1 34:  Barkhol/.. 
sup ra note 1 34.  a t  5 6 1  n . l ..\6 c· wa rc:lwusing  lessc n [ s J  t h e  n umber or possi b le  host i le 
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etttC le ncy in  the market for corpcm1te con trol is  subj ect  to grea t  
debate.1'' To ailow us to a n a i yze the  more d i fficu l t  case , we wi l l  as­
sume, arguendo, that  th i s  strat egy promotes e ffic iency in t he 
marke t for corporate con tro l .  
Liqu id i ty traders who fol i O\\ t h e  buy and hold strategy wi i l  not  
be h armed by ware h o u s i n g .  S i nce i i q ui d i ry n:1c.lcrs d o  n o t re a c t  t o  
i n rorn1 a t i on and changi ng p r i_ c ·: :� _  t h e y \\· i l l  n o t  s c: l l  t o  t h e  selected 
gro up .  Rather,  they v�i i t  con t i n ue 1 0  h o l e! u n t i i  rht' r e n der o ffc ;· i s  
a n n o unced. I t  i s  the  a n a l ysts \vho <He harmed .  As prices r ise d ue t o  
the  buying of the se lected group .  ;w,d ysts .  b-..: i ng ign oram abo u t  t h e  
rotent i a l takeover and be ing un ::::b ic  to  d i ffere nt iate noise tr2cl ing  
fro m  warehou s i n g ,  wi l l  in terpre t t h e  price incrc clse as overvalua­
t ion .  An a l ysts w i l l  then sel l  the s h a res only to d iscover t ha t  they are 
los ing takeover p remiums. Analysts wi l l  not  rece ive a normal  re­
turn on their i nvestment in i nformation,  and they wil l  rout ine ly  
u nderperform the marke t .  
ln  o ther  words, the ana lysts'  m a rket  i s  i n  da n ger from a d i fferen t  
k i nd of " ins iders"-"outs iders, . .  w h o  hold valuable private i nfor­
m at ion about the corporat ion .  The ''outs ide private i n fo rm a t i o n "  is  
no t produced with in  the corporation b u t  has an e ffect on the valua­
t ion of  the corporation .  From the analysts'  po i n t o f  view, i t  m akes 
no d ifference whether these " i ns ide rs/outs iders" trade in violat ion 
of a fid uc iary duty to the b i dder  or wit h the b idder's blessing; i n  
both cases, the analys ts w i l l  l o se . ' ' '  To the extent that takeover 
premiums cons ti tute a subs t a n t i al part  o f  a normal market return , 
s h are h o l d e rs that  wou l d t e n d e r .  e n a bl i n g  bidders to m a k e  su r<: t h e y  wo u l d  be 
t e n dered t he n cccssa.ry a moum of  swck to ga in  con t r o l  of the t a rget corpora t i o n . " ) .  
' '' Com pare R o n a l d  J .  G i l s o n .  A S t ruct ur < t l  t\ p prmtch :o Curporations:  T h e  Case 
Agai nst Defensive Tac t i cs in  Teil d e r  Of!ers. :::; S t a n .  L. Rev. 8 1 9. 846 ( 1 98 1 )  (a rguing 
that  " d e fe n sive t<tctics. if  succc:sslu i .  c i rcumvr: n t  t he mcch anism by wh.ieh the 
corporate structure co ns trains m a n :1ge rial  d isuc: t i on and . t h e re fore.  < m: i m p rope r . . ) . 
a n d  Lucian A. Bebchuk, Comment .  The C«sc for Facil i t a t i n g  Competing Ten d e r  
O ffers. 95 1-Iarv. L. R e v .  1028,  1 03 0  ( 1 982) ( a rg u i n g  t hat  takeovers oft e n  re su l t i n  a n  
i ncrease i n  : he compa ny's v a l ue a n d  t h a t  m<:�: ;_,ge m c n t  �hould not  :1ttcmpt t o  s t o p  the 
effurt .  b u t  rather should rac i i i t a te comp e t i n g  bids to secure the best  offer fur t h e  
shareholders) .  wi th  Easte rbrook & Fisc h e l .  s u pra nute 1 32 .  at l l 64 ( a rguing t h a t  legal 
rules " a l l owing the target's man;;gc m e n t  t u  c ngage in d e fe n s ive tact ics i t< response to 
a tend e r o [fer dccrea:;e share h o l d e rs we l fa re ·· )  .
.. ,., See J i l l  E. Fisch. Start i\-laking Sense:  ;\ ;1 !\ n:1 ly�is and Propo s a l for lnsiclc: 
Trading Regulat ion.  26 G a .  L. Rev.  1 79.  nrc ( L ')() l )  (rejec t ing t h e  fOCL!O' on t h o::: m c t h ud 
hy which a trader acquires nonp u b l i c  i n form:t t ion a n d  protK•�ing t o  pre m ise l ! a h i l i tv 
o n  an i t,s ici er's d uty  to the marketplace: ) .  
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consist e n t l y  l os in g  t h e s e  pre m i u m s  wi l l dri ve the a n a lysts out of t h e  
m arke t .  O n l y  if t a keover prem[ums const itute an insubstant ia l  part  
o f  t h e n o rmal  m arket r e turn can ware h o u s i ng be t o l e rated b y  ana-
iysts .  
Om a n a l y s i s  poi n ts to a tension b e t w e e n  pro m o t i n g  e ffici e n cy i n  
� h e  1 n �:_ rke t  fo r corporate  con trol  a n d  prorn o l i n? e ffic iency i n  t h r.?.  
,� (t n i L �-t l  n: a r k c t .  f f  t h e  se !cctc J gro u ·r) i s  cunlDOS•.;Li of  a n a l "i::; ts a n d  f .__ ' ¥ 
� \' t.: J- �._-· �tn ct l ys t  c2n cornpe t e ove r provi d i n g  \\'�;_ re h o u s i n g  servi ces t o  
b i d d e rs .  wareh o u s i n g  i s  n o t  h arm ful t o  Ll1e capital  m ark e t . i f, how­
C \T L  the se lected group does not  i n c l u de a n a l y s t s .  and a n a lysts 
h <·:vr: n o  C'pportun i t y  to compete over the p nJ'.· i si (Jn of ·warehous ing  
servi ct�S  to b id d e rs ,  t h e  tens ion  m us t be resol ved i n favor o f  re­
str ict ing ware housing.  I n creased takeove r costs for bi dders a n d  
l o vve r  r e t urns to a n a l ys t s  a r e  balanced o n  e i ther  s ide of  the sca le .  
G iven the m y r i a d  benefi ts the a n a lysts ' m a rk e t  produces,  t h e  scale  
should t i p in  the an a l ysts '  favor. 1 10 
Indeed,  on e might a s k  why i t  m a tters whether  the bidder h erseif 
conf iden t i a l l y  accu m ulates  the shares o f  the t arget or  w h e t h e r  a 
gro u p  acting o n  h e r  be h a l f  does so.  Since i n  both c ases t h e  a n alysts  
wi l l  lose , w h y  restrict d irect warehousing? TrUt� , a n a l ysts w i l l  l ose 
in both cases . If takeover premiums const i t ut e  a s u b s t a n t i a l  part  of 
the i r  ret urns, a n a l ysts w il l  need protection from bidders'  c o n fiden­
t ial  acc u m ul a tion o f  the target s h ares.  I n i t i al accum ulat ion o f  t h e  
sh ares o f  t h e  t arget ,  however,  i s  i m p o r t a n t  for t h e  b i dder .  Firs t ,  
h ol d i ng a b l ock o f  shares,  a foothold ,  p l aces t h e  bi dder i n  a b e t t e r  
posi t ion to s ucce ed i n  t h e  takeover.  Seco n d ,  a b l oc k of  s hares t h a t  
w a s  bough t for a l o w  price provides t h e  bidder w i t h  a h edge on h e r  
search costs .  In the c a s e  of l os ing t h e  t a rget t o  a n o t h e r  po t en t i a l 
bi dder.  t h e  fi rst bi d de;: \vi l l  make a profi t  when t e n de r i ng the b lock 
to the  n e w  b i d d e r. 1 1 1 Indeed,  h e re too,  t h e re is  tens ion between 
"" Sec i'v! acey.  s u p r a  n ote 6.  a t  2 0 .  M acey argues: 
i'<o defi n i t i o n  of publ ic  i n terest expl a i n s  ruk l 4e --3 . The () 1 1/r concc i vahk 
e\:pbnat ion i s  the p r i v a t e  i n terest ex p l ana t i on ofl'c rcd bv H ad d ock :md �:bccy: 
the ruk benefits corporate i nsiders whose pol i tical i n ll ucncc w i t h i n the  SEC is 
v�:s:. ly superior to the d i saggregatcd, u n o rganized shart:hulding p�..) p u l a t i o n  
h a r m e d  bv the rule. 
hi . ( e mphasis  ;:� d el e d ) .  Our e x a m i n<Hi o n  o f  t h e  ruk: ;;ugge s t s  that the tocus s h o u l d  be 
o n  the DWtcc t ion  o f  m a r k e t  analvsts .  
' "  Sc� Ronalci J .  G i lso n .  Secki�g Comp<::ti t i \··� Bids Versus Pure P<- I S'-'i v i ty  i n  Te n d e r  
C llc r  Dcfen:;e, 35 S ta n .  L. R e v .  5 l .  5 2  ( 1 982). 
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promoting t h e  e fficiency of  t h e  market  for corporat� control  a n d  
t h e  effi c i e ncy o f  capital m arkets .  T h e  W i l l i ams Ac{L r e s o l ves t h i s  
tension b y  m a n da t i n g  t h a t  poten ti a l  b i d ders discl ose t h e i r  i n t e n t i o n  
after  accu m u lat ing five perce n t  o f  t h e  t arge t s h a res .  Th is  ru l e  p r o ­
v i d e s  bidders w i t h  som e  foothold whi l e  protect i n g  a n a l y s t s  from 
l o s i n g  t h e i r  an t i c i pate d tal-; e over p re m i u m s .  Th i s  b a l ance is e l i '> 
tortcd  by w a r c h m1s ing .  I n  r h i s  l igh t . ware h ous ing j us t  c i r c u nl\c n h  
t h c  r e s t ri c t i o n  on t he b i d d e r ' s  o w n  accum u l a t i o n ,  a n d  t h us w i i i  !><.; ,  
u n d;::; r the  condi t i o ns e x p l a i ned e a r l ier ,  eq ually har mful  t o  a na l ys ts .  
CONCLU S I ON 
Framing t h e  q uest ion as w h e t he r  to award property r i g h t s  i n  i n ­
s i d e  i nformation to s h areholders or  m a n agers h a s  i e cl m a n y  
c o m m e n tators to cal l  for c o n tractual  resolution o f  t h e  m a t t e r .  As 
we s h owed in  t h i s  Art i c l e ,  the  b inary framing of the quest ion has 
obscured a t h i rd ,  supe r i o r  opt ion:  awarding the prop e rt y  r ight  to 
m a r k e t  analysts .  When m a r k e t  a n alysts are taken i n t o  acc o u n t ,  i t  
becomes apparen t  that  t h e  c h o i ce between i ns i ders a n d  m ar k e t  
an alysts e mbodies a b r o a d e r  pol icy c hoice b e t w e e n  a n  i n e ffi c i e n t  
and a n  e fficient  i nformat io n  m a r k e t .  Grant i n g  t h e  propert y  r i g h t  t o  
i ns iders  w i l l  l e a d  to a m a r k e t  with  v e r y  l i m ited i n t e r - i n s i d e r  compe­
t i t i o n ;  conferr ing i t  upon a n a l ysts wil l  create t r ue compe t i t i o n .  
vVe also showed t h a t  competi t ion among a n a l ysts  w i l l  provide 
superior e ffi c iency and l i q u i d i ty to financia l  markets  r e i a t i ve t o  i n ­
s i d e rs .  T h e  i mproved e ffic i e ncy a n d  l iqu i d i t y  w i l l  prompt gre a t e r  
investm e n t  in fi nancial  m a r k e ts ,  and t h e y  w i l l  attract i n t e rn a t i on a l  
comp a ni e s  to i n vest  i n  t h e  U n i te d  S tates .  Fur t he r m o r e ,  c o m p e t i ­
t i o n  among an alysts generates s ubstantial  posi tive extern a i i t i e s  for 
the i nformat ion market and the i nvestment bank i ng i nd u s t r y .  None 
of  these pos i t i ve e ffects i s  l ik e l y  t o  arise under a purely con tractual  
regi m e .  O n l y  a vi brant analysts '  m arkets can produce t h e m .  
Final ly ,  t h e  broad m a r k e t  perspective we developed i n  t h i s  Art i ­
c le  helped i l l u m i n ate two p a r t i c u l a r  aspects of  i ns i d e r  t ra d i n g :  
s e l ec t i ve d i sclosure a n d  warehousing.  I n  both i n s t a n c e s ,  w e  de m o n ­
s trated t h a t  any attempt to regul a te t h e s e  practices m u s t  t a k e  i n t o  
acco unt t h e  impact o f  t h e  proposed regu l at ion o n  m a r k e t  a n a lysts 
'"  1 .5  U . S .C.  � �  78m(d)-(e) & 78(d )-(f) ( 1 988). 
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and that failure to do so wil l  underm i n e  the efficiency of the regu­
latory scheme. 
We believe that the novel market perspective we developed i n  thi s  
A11icle might fi n a l l y  br ing a n  e n d  t o  o n e  o f  the longest lasting puz­
zles in  Law and Economics scholars h i p :  the ban on insider tradi ng.  
